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Privileged Access to Financial Innovation
Cary Martin Shelby*
Access to private funds is limited to an elite class of investors—
wealthy individuals and large institutions. Individuals of more modest
means—“retail investors”—face more limited investment choices;
generally they can only invest in mutual funds. Despite this inequitable
division, the current regulatory climate will lead to an even further
expansion of the private fund industry. This Article argues that this
loosening regulatory climate could lead to a talent drain amongst
registered funds, could narrow the investment choices available to
retail investors, and could deepen the already troubling income gap
between wealthy and average earners. With respect to a possible talent
drain, as it becomes easier for issuers to avoid the arduous registration
requirements of the federal securities laws, many investment advisers
will simply “go private” by instead offering hedge funds or other
private investments. In assessing privileged access to strategies,
because private funds are permitted to engage in more flexible trading
strategies through the use of derivatives and other exotic instruments,
elite investors have better opportunities for wealth maximization and
diversification. A large body of empirical research has also found that
private fund advisers often have privileged access to valuable
information regarding upcoming investments. To the extent that this
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privileged access continues to grow, the options available to retail
investors will continue to decline. From a broader perspective, this
could magnify the financial challenges facing retail investors, some of
which include dwindling retirement savings and declining property
values, as well as deepen the already troubling income gap in this
country. Alternative frameworks could entail: (1) loosening the capital
restrictions that apply to mutual funds so that retail investors can
access a greater degree of financial innovation, or (2) tightening the
existing freedoms that apply to private funds, so as to level the playing
field between retail and elite investors. However, the long-term and
short-term effects to systemic risk, investor protection, and capital
formation would have to be thoroughly investigated before adopting any
proposed solution along this spectrum. This would necessarily require
enhanced coordination between the Securities and Exchange
Commission (“SEC”) and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission
(“CFTC”), and improved collaboration with related industries (e.g.,
economic, financial, banking, quantitative analysis, etc.).
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“Performing in all Conditions” is the phrase that outlines the bottom
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of the advertisement.1 Just above those words, three snowboarders are
climbing a tall mountain that is covered in deep layers of snow. 2 It is
evident that they have completed something special. Their arms wave
in triumph. Each snowboarder miraculously persevered despite the
blistering cold, the threatening mounds of snow, and the mountain’s
intimidating steepness. Thoughts of determination and drive are
automatically elicited by this image. In fact, this picture seems to
represent every possible characteristic that could generally be associated
with success. At the very top of the page, the words “Balyasny Asset
Management” are emblazoned in capital letters.3 It is therefore implied
that something about this firm holds the same promise of success and
perseverance for a greater number of people: that, similar to these
snowboarders, this firm can also achieve the impossible by delivering
superior results under extreme conditions.
Upon further investigation, one can easily find that this company is a
highly successful hedge fund that manages a total of approximately $4.3
billion.4 Although this ad is visible to all members of the general
public, only a finite number of elite investors can invest with this fund.5
This elite class of investors includes wealthy individuals and
institutional investors such as insurance companies, pension plans, and
endowments.6 Retail investors, which include the legions of individuals
who do not meet the stringent net worth and income requirements for
becoming an elite investor, are prohibited from investing directly with
hedge funds.7 Thus, they are largely excluded from accessing this
vehicle that promises to “perform in all conditions.”
Retail investors are mainly stuck with mutual funds, which is an
industry that is plagued with severe regulatory constraints placed on the
strategies of such funds.8 These constraints make it difficult for mutual
funds to consistently beat the market.9 Numerous studies and surveys
have found that a large percentage of mutual funds have not been able

1. Alexandra Stevenson, With Ban on Ads Removed, Hedge Funds Test Waters, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 20, 2014, 6:12 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/02/20/with-ban-on-ads-lifted-hedgefunds-test-waters/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=1.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b)(2)(i) (2015).
6. These elite investors are legally defined as “accredited investors” under the Securities Act
of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(15) (2012) & 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a).
7. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b)(2)(ii).
8. See discussion infra Part III.A.
9. See discussion infra Part III.B (explaining how the Company Act allows hedge funds to
circumvent many of the restrictions that are placed on mutual funds).
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to consistently earn returns that exceed the S&P 500. 10 Furthermore,
restrictions under the Investment Company Act of 1940 (“Company
Act”) have historically narrowed the universe of investment options
available to registered funds.11 They are generally limited to stocks,
bonds, and cash instruments. In contrast, private funds have unfettered
access to innovative products such as derivatives, illiquid instruments,
distressed securities, and other exotic instruments, which are minimally
available to registered funds. The adverse consequences of these
constraints were most visible during the recent financial crisis, where
certain hedge funds relied on their increased freedoms to engage in
short-trading and other innovative strategies to earn a sizable return for
their underlying investors.12 On the whole, the hedge fund industry
outperformed the mutual fund industry during the financial crisis of
2007–10 (commonly known as the “Great Recession”).13 More
specifically, in 2008, the value of global equities collectively fell “42
percent while hedge funds worldwide lost a comparatively smaller 19
percent for their investors.”14 As retail investors face dwindling
retirement and savings accounts, an increasing retirement age, and
decreasing property values, the disparities created by this divide become
more problematic and more difficult to justify. 15
These disparities are exacerbated by a regulatory climate that seems
to support an even greater expansion of the private fund industry. 16
Although the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 has subjected private funds to
increased registration requirements under the Investment Advisers Act
of 1940 (“Advisers Act”),17 this Article demonstrates that the current
10. Richard Finger, Five Reasons Your Mutual Fund Probably Underperforms The Market,
FORBES (Apr. 15, 2013, 9:16 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/richardfinger/2013/04/15/fivereasons-your-mutual-fund-probably-underperforms-the-market/ (referring to a study that found
“66.08 percent of all domestic equity mutual funds underperformed when matched against the
S&P 1500”). See generally Associated Press, FAIL: 84% Of Actively Managed Mutual Funds
Did Worse Than Their Benchmarks In 2011, BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 12, 2012, 8:23 PM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/84-mutual-funds-underperform-2012-3; Justin Fox, Breaking
News: Mutual Fund Managers Keep Failing to Beat the Market, TIME (Apr. 20, 2009),
http://business.time.com/2009/04/20/breaking-news-mutual-fund-managers-keep-failing-to-beatthe-market/ (“To be precise, 66.21% of actively managed domestic stock funds underperformed
the S&P Composite 1500 Index in the five years from 2004 through 2008.”).
11. See discussion infra Part III.A.
12. Houman B. Shadab, The Law and Economics of Hedge Funds: Financial Innovation and
Investor Protection, 6 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 240, 244 (2009) (arguing that hedge fund flexibilities
generally allow such advisers to consistently outperform the broader markets).
13. Id.
14. Id. at 243–44.
15. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
16. See discussion infra Part II.
17. See discussion infra text accompanying notes 274–77 (providing a brief description of
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regulatory environment has now shifted to support an even greater
expansion of the private fund industry. For instance, hedge funds can
now advertise, which is a monumental shift in our regulatory
paradigm.18 This new power to advertise will likely fuel growth by
making it easier for private funds to access prospective investors.19
Congress conferred this new power through the recently passed
Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (“JOBS Act”),20 which also makes
it easier for private funds to evade “public” status under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”).21 In addition, amendments to
safe harbors provided under the Securities Act of 1933 (“Securities
Act”) have made it easier for investors in private funds to liquidate their
private investments into cash.22
Commentators have offered intriguing explanations for this
phenomenon. Some attribute this climate to the significant resources
that private industries employ in lobbying for more lenient
regulations.23 Professor Zachary Gubler has argued, “the expansion of
the private securities market can be viewed as a political strategy on the
part of the SEC to maximize its bureaucratic career support in the face
of uncertainty over how to reform the dysfunctionality of the public
market.”24 Our current regulatory climate can be attributed to a number
of factors, and can even benefit the elite class of investors that have
access to private funds.25 But it can potentially lead to troubling
new registration requirements under the Dodd-Frank Act).
18. See discussion infra Part I.B (detailing the elimination of the solicitation ban and its likely
effects on private investment companies).
19. Id.
20. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112–106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012).
21. See discussion infra Part I.D (explaining how the increase in the threshold for the number
of investors that will trigger public status allows investment companies to avoid periodic
disclosure requirements).
22. See discussion infra Part II.C (describing how recent amendments have resulted in shorter
mandatory holding periods).
23. Clea Benson & Cheyenne Hopkins, Paulson Leads Hedge-Fund Lobby Push to Privatize
Fannie, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 30, 2013, 11:11 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-04-30/
paulson-leads-hedge-fund-lobby-push-to-privatize-fannie.html; Sarah N. Lynch, US Hedge Fund
Industry Pushing Derivatives Regulator to Lift Ad Ban, REUTERS (Jan. 8, 2014, 3:28 PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/08/usa-hedgefunds-advertising-idUSL2N0JY21R201401
08; Kevin Spak, Hedge Funds Get ‘Sweet Deal’ in Finance Bill, NEWSER (May 3, 2010, 8:28
AM),
http://www.newser.com/story/87634/hedge-funds-get-sweet-deal-in-finance-bill.html;
Jenna Staul, Hedge Fund Industry Presses On With New Lobbying Effort, HUFFINGTON POST
(Mar. 18, 2010, 5:12 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/10/16/hedge-fund-industrypress
_n_324100.html.
24. Zachary J. Gubler, Public Choice Theory and the Private Securities Market, 91 N.C. L.
REV. 745, 796 (2013).
25. See Cary Martin, One Step Forward for Hedge Fund Investors: The Removal of the
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outcomes for the general public. This Article argues that the loosening
regulatory climate could lead to a talent drain amongst registered funds,
narrow the investment choices available to retail investors, and deepen
the already troubling income gap between wealthy and average earners.
By and large, as it becomes easier for issuers to avoid the arduous
registration requirements of the federal securities laws, many
investment advisers will simply “go private” by offering hedge funds or
other private investments.26 This could lead to a significant drain of
superior talent for those left behind as managers in the mutual fund
industry.27 Moreover, the economic disparities created by this growing
industry have likely trumped the investor protection concerns that have
historically supported the separation of private and public funds.28
Because private funds are permitted to engage in more flexible trading
strategies through the use of leverage and derivatives, such investors
have better opportunities for wealth maximization and diversification.29
A large body of empirical research has also found that private fund
advisers often have privileged access to valuable information regarding
upcoming investments.30 Fostering a regulatory environment that
promotes such inequities could further aggravate the financial
challenges facing retail investors, some of which include dwindling
retirement savings, declining property values, and a disappearing
middle class.31 It could also contribute to the growing income divide
between the wealthy and the average earner in this country. 32 Professor
Thomas Piketty’s national bestseller, Capital in the Twenty-First
Century, provides an in-depth economic analysis of both the scale and
the drivers of this growing income gap.33 Generally speaking, this
deepening divide could hinder economic growth, and lead to political

Solicitation Ban and the Challenges that Lie Ahead, 16 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 1143 (2014) [hereinafter
Martin, One Step Forward].
26. See discussion infra Part III (highlighting the ability of hedge funds to avoid many of the
restrictions placed on mutual funds).
27. See discussion infra Part II.C (explaining the potential benefits of going private including
performance fees).
28. See discussion infra Part IV.A (suggesting that investor protection rationale becomes less
convincing as private companies extend their reach to the general public).
29. See discussion infra Part III.
30. See discussion infra Part III.C (describing the advantage private fund advisers receive
from the ability to access valuable information).
31. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
32. See discussion infra Part IV.B (outlining competing views from economists regarding the
long term implications of inequality among investors).
33. See THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 15 (Arthur
Goldhammer trans., 2014).

MARTIN SHELBY (315-368).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

Privileged Access to Financial Innovation

10/9/2015 5:16 PM

321

and social unrest.34 Although it is admittedly difficult to directly
correlate this divide with our federal securities laws, this Article should
at least demonstrate that more research is needed in this regard. At face
value, it seems unsettling to encourage a regulatory system where top
earners have access to even greater capital gains through private
investments, while the general public is left with investments that are
perhaps subpar.
Crafting a viable solution highlights the unique challenges of
applying a reliable cost-benefit analysis to new regulations in light of
the growing complexities of the financial markets. Loosening the
antiquated trading restrictions that apply to mutual fund investments
would allow advisers to employ strategies that could further protect
investors in declining markets. This would create better opportunities
for wealth maximization and diversification for the general public. And
because mutual funds are subject to the detailed registration
requirements under the Company Act (and other enhancements under
the Dodd-Frank Act), 35 they may be better suited to trade in such risky
instruments given the heightened disclosure and governance
requirements that are designed to protect retail investors. However, the
costs to investor protection and market integrity could be monumental,
particularly because these instruments are often inordinately complex,
and could expose the broader economy to increased systemic risk.
Alternatively, specific limitations could be imposed on hedge funds’
leverage exposure and speculative trading activities, since the
overindulgence in these undertakings could expose the general public to
negative externalities. However, the costs of limiting such activities
could unduly constrain capital formation, which is further complicated
by the fact that pension funds and other institutional investors (that are
comprised of underlying retail investors) are increasingly investing in
these vehicles.36 As such, the long-term and short-term effects to
systemic risk, investor protection, and capital formation would have to
be thoroughly investigated before adopting any proposed solution along
this spectrum. Enhancing coordination between the Securities and
Exchange Commission (“SEC”) and Commodity Futures Trading
Commission (“CFTC”), and improving collaboration with related
industries (e.g., economic, financial, banking, quantitative analysis,
34. Id.
35. 15 U.S.C. § 80b–3 (2012).
36. But see discussion infra text accompanying notes 178–83 (discussing the withdrawal of
hedge fund investments by the California retirement system agency CalPERS, and the increased
interest in hedge funds by institutional investors, in spite of CalPERS’ recent withdrawal from the
industry).
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etc.), are necessary first steps for deriving an appropriate solution for
these growing inequities.
This Article is a continuation of my prior research as I have
consistently explored, from a variety of perspectives, the extent to
which investor protection should be reframed to accommodate the
rampant financial innovation that has occurred in the past decades.37
This Article seeks to shift gears by focusing on the economic impact to
retail investors, who have not directly benefited from the loosening of
restrictions for private funds. In addition, this piece builds on the
existing literature on this topic, which has consistently investigated the
pervasive inequities that naturally derive from this division of
investors.38 This Article renews this debate within the framework of the
current regulatory climate of fostering private fund expansion. It also
proposes alternative solutions that entail reassessing the caps on
leverage that currently apply to registered funds and enhancing
coordination between the SEC and the CFTC to derive more effective
regulation.
Part I begins by highlighting the growing prevalence of the

37. See generally Cary Martin, Is Systemic Risk Prevention the New Paradigm? A Proposal
to Expand Investor Protection Principles to the Hedge Fund Industry, 86 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 87
(2012) [hereinafter Martin, Systematic Risk Prevention] (arguing that Dodd-Frank does not
provide enough information to adequately protect hedge fund investors); Cary Martin, Private
Investment Companies in the Wake of the Financial Crisis: Rethinking the Effectiveness of the
Sophisticated Investor Exemption, 37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 49 (2012) [hereinafter Martin, Private
Investment Companies].
38. See Samuel Brunson, Mutual Funds, Fairness, and the Income Gap, 65 ALA. L. REV. 139,
142 (2013) (focusing on inequitable tax rates between public and private funds as “mutual fund
investors must pay taxes on non-existent gains, but the wealthy can use alternative investment
strategies to avoid such taxes, the taxation of mutual funds violates the tax policy objective of
vertical equity”); Gubler, supra note 24, at 754–68 (arguing that the SEC has implicitly supported
the expansion of the private market due to uncertainty regarding effective regulation of public
markets); Usha Rodrigues, Securities Law’s Dirty Little Secret, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 3389,
3402–06 (2013) (examining the recent emergence of private secondary markets to highlight
growing disparities among investors and to further illuminate resulting harms to overall markets);
Jeff Schwartz, Reconceptualizing Investment Management Regulation, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV.
521, 568–83 (2009) (investigating reform agenda based on the libertarian-paternalist notion that
government intervention should aim to bolster consumer decision making without undermining
freedom of choice); Jasmin Sethi, Another Role for Securities Regulation: Expanding Investor
Opportunity, 16 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 783, 829–36 (2011) (advocating for the inclusion
of “opportunities for wealth accumulation” analysis, particularly for the average investor, as basis
for adopting new securities regulations); Houman B. Shadab, Fending for Themselves: Creating a
U.S. Hedge Fund Market for Retail Investors, 11 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 251, 309 (2008)
(discussing the economic harms of excluding retail investors from private fund markets but
proposes the creation of “a retail [Fund of Hedge Funds (“FOHF”)] that raises capital through a
private placement to an underwriter (or syndicate of underwriters) who, in turn, lists the securities
of the retail FOHF on a trading platform accessible only by sophisticated investors”).
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investment company industry.39 This Part continues with a detailed
explanation of how the current regulatory climate will nurture an even
greater expansion of the private fund industry. Part II then explains
how this future expansion could lead to a drain of talent from public
funds.40 As the private fund industry has grown easier to access,
advisers may steer away from the arduous registration requirements of
mutual funds. Part III continues this analysis by describing the growing
inequities that retail investors will likely face with respect to access to
strategies and information.41 As private funds are granted increasing
liberties, retail investors will be left with an even smaller universe of
available strategies and investment options. Part IV illuminates the
broader implications of promoting such inequitable access. 42 Though
more research is needed in this regard, such inequities could exacerbate
the already challenging financial environment facing retail investors. It
could also contribute to the growing income gap between the wealthy
and the average investor. The Article concludes with brief thoughts
about the limitations of crafting an immediate solution without first
enhancing coordination between the SEC and the CFTC and improving
collaboration with related industries.43
I. EXPANSION OF PRIVATE FUND INDUSTRY
This Part begins by elucidating the vital role that both public and
private funds play in the financial markets as investors depend on these
vehicles for a variety of saving mechanisms. Registered funds still
account for a larger share of public savings,44 but the prominence of
private funds has grown exponentially over the years.45 As such, this
Part proceeds with a detailed explanation of how the current regulatory
climate will lead to an even greater insurgence of these vehicles. The
recently passed JOBS Act and amendments to the omnipresent
Securities Act have removed many of the restrictions that previously
applied to private funds.
A. Prevalence of Investment Companies
Investment companies play a dominant role in the public capital
markets. Individual retail investors, who directly invest in a range of
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

See infra Part I.
See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part V.
See infra notes 54–55 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 67–74 and accompanying text.
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private or public issuers for their own personal accounts, are a dying
breed.46 An investor who wishes to utilize the public capital markets to
boost his or her retirement savings would rarely spend time researching
a plethora of companies for direct investment. Retail investors instead
generally allocate their capital to a number of registered investment
companies such as mutual funds, bond funds, and money market
funds.47 From a practical perspective, this evolution makes sense as
these vehicles provide investors with immediate access to expertise, risk
management, and diversification.48 The advisers that manage such
companies are presumably comprised of talented individuals who
possess an astute expertise in financial management.49 These “experts”
collect investments from a large number of both individual and
institutional investors and thereby invest that pool in a variety of
issuers, instruments, and strategies.50 This saves individual investors
the time and money of having to parse through a seemingly infinite
number of disclosures related to a range of companies across various
sectors and concentrations. Advisers have also aggressively marketed
their mutual fund products to the general public, which is yet another
contributing factor to the growth of the industry. 51 In exchange for
managing a mutual fund, such advisers receive significant management
fees,52 which are typically calculated as a percentage of the total net
assets of the pool.53
Mutual funds are the most prevalent category of investment
46. See generally Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC, Retail Investors, and the
Institutionalization of the Securities Markets, 95 VA. L. REV. 1025 (2009) (asserting that the SEC
faces new challenges as markets have become increasingly institutionalized).
47. Mutual Funds Can Help Lower Investing Risks, VANGUARD, https://investor.vanguard.
com/mutual-funds (last visited Sept. 8, 2015); Types of Mutual Funds, AM. FUNDS,
https://www.americanfunds.com/resources/choices/funds/mutual-funds.html (last visited Sept. 8,
2015); Ultimate Guide to Retirement, CNN MONEY, http://money.cnn.com/retirement/guide/
investing_mutualfunds.moneymag/index3.htm (last visited Sept. 8, 2015).
48. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, MUTUAL FUNDS: A GUIDE FOR INVESTORS 6 (2010),
http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/sec-guide-to-mutual-funds.pdf [hereinafter MUTUAL FUND
GUIDE].
49. Id.
50. Id. But see discussion infra Part II.B (describing how the rise of index funds has undercut
the need for “expert” management since they rely on computer programs to replicate a basket of
instruments represented by an index).
51. See generally infra Part II.B (discussing how growth in the mutual fund industry could be
attributed to marketing as opposed to “talent”).
52. John P. Freeman, Stewart L. Brown & Steve Pomerantz, Mutual Fund Advisory Fees:
New Evidence and a Fair Fiduciary Duty Test, 61 OKLA. L. REV. 83, 89–92 (2008) (summarizing
statistics that prove high profitability of mutual fund managers largely results from management
fees).
53. Mutual Fund Fees & Expenses, FIDELITY, https://www.fidelity.com/learning-center/invest
ment-products/mutual-funds/fees-expenses#Managementfees (last visited Sept. 8, 2015).
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companies in the United States, as they are available for investment by
the general public. In 2014, the mutual fund industry managed nearly
$16 trillion in assets.54 Over half of the individuals in the United States
have direct or indirect investments in mutual funds. 55 These individuals
depend on mutual funds as a saving vehicle for college tuition,
retirement, and many other major life events. 56 Because our federal
securities laws are rooted in investor protection for the masses, these
pooled investment companies must register under these laws.57
Advisers are then required to provide detailed disclosures to their
underlying investors and comply with numerous governance and
compliance requirements.58 Registered investment companies are also
restricted from investing in “riskier” classes of instruments, and from
leveraging a high percentage of its assets. 59 These restrictions are
designed to protect the underlying investors from overzealous advisers
who may engage in riskier practices to the detriment of unsuspecting
investors.
In contrast, private investment companies include private equity
funds, venture capital funds, and hedge funds, among others. These
companies rely on various exemptions under our intricate, yet evolving,
web of federal securities laws to maintain greater flexibilities with
respect to trading strategies, disclosure practices, valuation mechanisms,
and governance requirements.60 Generally speaking, issuers can
employ these flexibilities in exchange for restricting investments to
accredited investors.61 Such investors include natural persons who
either earn over $200,000 of annual income, or own over $1 million in
net assets (excluding the value of an individual’s primary residence).62
54. INV. CO. INST., 2014 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK: A REVIEW OF TRENDS AND
ACTIVITIES IN THE U.S. INVESTMENT COMPANY INDUSTRY 26, http://www.icifactbook.org
/fb_ch2.html#investor.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77mm (2012) (outlining general registration
requirements); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78mm; Investment Company
Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1(a)(2); Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11)
(defining “Investment Adviser”).
58. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77mm (outlining general registration requirements); id. §§ 78a–
78mm; id. § 80a-1(a)(2); id. § 80b-2(a)(11) (defining “Investment Adviser”).
59. See discussion infra Part IV.A (explaining unique financial challenges facing retail
investors).
60. See generally U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, IMPLICATIONS OF THE GROWTH OF HEDGE
FUNDS: STAFF REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 8–13
(2003), http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/hedgefunds0903.pdf [hereinafter SEC STAFF REPORT]
(explaining regulatory exemptions upon which hedge funds rely).
61. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(15); 17 C.F.R. § 230.501 (2015).
62. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.501 (regulating that under the Dodd-Frank Act, the SEC can re-
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Accredited investors also include a wide range of institutions such as
insurance companies, pension plans, endowments, and banks.63
Theoretically, these investment schemes enjoy greater flexibilities
because accredited investors have the resources to adequately protect
themselves.64
Although these investment companies are in fact private, the private
fund industry has grown exponentially over the past decades. For
example, the total hedge fund industry is comprised of approximately
18,000 funds,65 and in the United States, the industry manages
approximately $2.93 trillion.66 In February 2014, investors allocated
$41 billion of additional capital to hedge fund investments, which is
“the largest monthly allocation since [eVestment] began tracking
monthly flows in October 2008.”67 Many investors are flocking to
hedge funds because they enjoy greater flexibilities to maximize returns
through derivatives trading and unrestrained leverage, which are
minimally available to their mutual fund counterparts. 68 The New York
City retirement systems recently made the controversial decision to
increase its hedge fund investments from $450 million to $3.5 billion,69
and the Princeton endowment has portioned as much as 25% of its
portfolio into hedge fund investments.70 This growth has occurred
despite the increased registration requirements that were implemented
under the Dodd-Frank Act.71 Overall, the hedge fund industry still
evaluate this definition, as it applies to natural persons, every four years); see also Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. Law 111–203, 124 Stat. 1376.
§ 413 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 80b–3(b)) (familiarly known as the “Dodd-Frank
Act”).
63. Id.
64. SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 125 (1953).
65. Hedge Fund Adviser FAQ’s, MANAGED FUNDS ASS’N, http://www.managedfunds.org
/hedge-fund-investors/faqs/hedge-fund-advisor/ (last visited Sept. 8, 2015).
66. eVestment Data Show Historic Inflows for Hedge Funds in February, MANAGED FUNDS
ASS’N, (Mar. 27, 2014), http://www.managedfunds.org/2014/03/evestment-data-show-historicinflows-hedge-funds-february/.
67. Nina Bains, Welcome Back, Hedge Funds, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 21, 2014, 9:19 AM), http://
blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2014/03/21/welcome-back-hedge-funds.
68. See discussion infra Part IV.B (discussing the growing income gap). However, this
increased flexibility could expose investors, as well as the broader economy, to heightened risks
given the increased exposure to excessive losses and systemic risk that can result from derivatives
and leverage. See discussion infra Part III.C.
69. Daniel Solin, The New York Pension Plan Folly, USNEWS (Mar. 7, 2013, 10:30 AM),
http://money.usnews.com/money/blogs/On-Retirement/2013/03/07/the-new-york-pension-planfolly.
70. Gillian Wee, Princeton Endowment Plans to Cut Ranks of Private-Equity Managers in
Half, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Oct. 21, 2010, 11:00 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-1022/princeton-endowment-plans-to-cut-ranks-of-private-equity-managers-in-half.html.
71. See infra Part III.C. at 142 (providing a brief description of new registration requirements
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plays a major role “on stock, bond, currency, commodity, and other
markets, and they have been major players in virtually all aspects of
modern finance, including mortgage lending.”72
Private equity funds are yet another class of private investment
companies that have grown in popularity in recent years. In 2013,
private equity funds managed approximately $3.5 trillion.73 During this
same year, the private equity industry experienced the highest aggregate
amount of capital raised since 2008, with 873 funds reaching a final
close and raising an aggregate $454 billion.74 There are several types of
private equity fund structures, some of which include venture capital
funds, leveraged buyouts, and mezzanine financing.75 For the most
part, private equity funds invest directly into private companies and
typically acquire large blocks of illiquid securities.76 Private equity
funds “are seen as helping create new businesses, fostering innovation
and assisting businesses in need of restructuring.” 77 Private equity
investors consist of elite and institutional investors who are able to
invest for long periods of time since such investments often demand
long holding periods.78 Unlike registered funds, a private equity fund is
usually a closed-ended vehicle, which means that it does not accept new
investors once it acquires the majority of its initial capital and it does
not permit investor withdrawals until the fund dissolves. 79
Given these flexibilities, the private fund industry will continue to
grow in the coming years. The Dodd-Frank Act required many hedge
fund advisers to register under the Advisers Act and gave the SEC the
power to collect confidential information from such registered
advisers.80 Many thought that the costs of these new requirements

under the Dodd-Frank Act).
72. Michael Panzner, Why Are Hedge Funds So Important in Today’s Market?, SEEKING
ALPHA (Aug. 31, 2007, 4:26 AM), http://seekingalpha.com/article/46121-why-are-hedge-fundsso-important-in-todays-market.
73. 2014 PREQIN GLOBAL PRIVATE EQUITY REPORT, PREQIN 14 (2014), https://www.preqin
.com/docs/samples/The_2014_Preqin_Global_Private_Equity_Report_Sample_Pages.pdf.
74. Id. at 70.
75. THOMAS P. LEMKE ET AL., HEDGE FUNDS AND OTHER PRIVATE FUNDS: REGULATION
AND COMPLIANCE § 12.1 (2013).
76. Private Equity, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/privateequity.asp#
axzz1Q2GK605U (last visited Sept. 8, 2015).
77. Andrew J. Donohue, Testimony Concerning Regulating Hedge Funds and Other Private
Investment Pools (July 15, 2009), http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/2009/ts071509ajd.htm
(statement of the Director of Division of Investment Management for the U.S. SEC).
78. Private Equity, supra note 76.
79. LEMKE ET AL., supra note 75, at 280.
80. See infra text accompanying notes 152–54 (providing a brief description of new
registration requirements under the Dodd-Frank Act).
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might hinder the growth of the industry. However, since the passage of
the Dodd-Frank Act, the regulatory climate has shifted to in fact foster
the accelerated growth of private funds. Exemptions provided under the
Securities Act and the Exchange Act have recently been retooled.81
Under these revisions, private funds can now advertise to the general
public, can more easily evade “public” status under the Exchange Act,
and can provide private investors with greater liquidity through newly
created exchanges for private shares.82
B. Advertising
The JOBS Act was enacted under the Obama Administration on April
5, 2012.83 One of the most notable components of the JOBS Act is its
elimination of the solicitation ban for private companies that rely on
Rule 506 of Regulation D.84 As background, this rule was crafted by
the SEC in 1982 to provide clarity to issuers who wanted to rely on the
Section 4(2) exemption under the Securities Act.85 Under Section 4(2),
issuers could avoid the arduous disclosure requirements associated with
offering securities (as defined under the Securities Act) if such
transactions did not involve a “public” offering.86
The logic of this provision was quite simple. If an offering did not
affect the general public, then there was no need for public disclosures
and other kinds of protections.87 Under these circumstances, the costs
of registering an initial offering of securities would far exceed any
potential benefits, particularly if there was no risk of harm to the public
capital markets. In passing the statute in 1933, Congress did little to
provide a specific definition of what exactly a “public” offering
entailed.88 The SEC and the courts did provide additional clarity as to
the contours of a “public” offering, but issuers still faced significant
uncertainty in legitimately crafting a private placement.89 Regulation D

81. See infra Part I.D (discussing how changes made it easier for private companies to avoid
the cumbersome registration requirements).
82. See infra Part I.D (discussing the effects of the JOBS Act provisions).
83. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112–106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012).
84. Id. § 201(a), 126 Stat. 306 at 313.
85. See Revision of Certain Exemptions from Registration for Transactions Involving Limited
Offers and Sales, Securities Act Release No. 6389, 24 SEC Docket 1166 (Mar. 8, 1982) (debuting
the uniform notice of sales to be used for all offerings).
86. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (2012).
87. COMM. ON INTERSTATE & FOREIGN COMMERCE, H.R. REP. NO. 73–85, at 5 (1933).
88. Id.
89. Martin, Private Investment Companies, supra note 37, at 65–67 (describing the evolution
of the sophisticated investor doctrine which presumes that sophisticated investors can fend for
themselves).
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was promulgated by the SEC in response to the ambiguities presented
by these previous tests. This rule essentially provides bright-line safe
harbors to prevent issuers from inadvertently engaging in a public
offering.90
Rule 506 is the most permissive exemption provided for under
Regulation D. It allows private issuers to raise an unlimited amount of
capital and offer interests to an unlimited number of accredited
investors.91 The other exemptions provided under Regulation D place
ceilings on the total amount of capital that an issuer can accept from
investors.92 For example, under Rule 504 an issuer cannot accept more
than $1 million from prospective investors in a single private offering. 93
Under Rule 505, issuers cannot accept more than $5 million.94 In
exchange, however, vehicles relying on Rule 506 prior to the JOBS Act
were prohibited from advertising their exempt offerings to the general
public.95 This restriction was designed to prevent retail investors from
accidentally investing in such funds, to preserve the private nature of
these entities, and to perhaps restrict the size of the industry.96
This advertising restriction encompassed a wide range of both direct
and indirect communications between private issuers and prospective
investors.97 A private issuer could lose its Rule 506 exemption by
communicating any aspect of its underlying business to the press, by
mentioning a fund name in an interview, or by maintaining informative
websites regarding its offerings or investment strategies.98 Given this
broad restriction on communications with prospective investors, issuers
relying on Rule 506 were only allowed to solicit investors with which
they had a sufficient preexisting relationship.99 Such preexisting
relationships are deemed sufficient if the nature of the relationship
enables the issuer (or person acting on its behalf) to be aware of the
financial circumstances or sophistication of the persons with whom the
relationship exists.100 The issuer must also acquire this relationship
90. Martin, One Step Forward, supra note 25, at 1145.
91. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2015).
92. Martin, One Step Forward, supra note 25, at 1151.
93. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506.
94. Id.
95. Id. §§ 230.506, 502(c).
96. Id. § 230.502(c).
97. Id.
98. See generally Martin, One Step Forward, supra note 25, at Part II.A (explaining the rules
that provided issuers with clear standards as to whether companies were acting as private
vehicles).
99. In re Kenman Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 21962 (1982).
100. Mineral Lands Research & Mktg. Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1985 WL 5568055694
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before the terms of the offering are created and before the contemplated
offering begins.101 As a result, hedge funds would often restrict
marketing activities to personal or close networks of potential investors
with which they already had a relationship.102
If an issuer did not have access to these kinds of preexisting
relationships with accredited investors, it could simply contract for such
access from registered financial intermediaries, such as brokers or
placement agents.103 When utilizing this option, “funds enter into
formal placement arrangements with major investment firms such as
Morgan Stanley, [or] Merrill Lynch. . . . These firms are typically
compensated through a placement fee or sales charge . . . .”104 This
practice has been deemed legally sound by the SEC as these
intermediaries are simply soliciting investors who have a general
interest in investing in private placements.105 These solicitations often
take the form of online suitability questionnaires, which are designed to
determine whether a prospective investor qualifies as accredited under
Rule 501.106
With this new ability to advertise, hedge fund advisers will no longer
be constrained by the previous requirement to have a preexisting
relationship with an investor before making a sales pitch. Nor will they
be forced to forge a relationship with a placement agent to purchase
access to pools of accredited investors. They will now have the ability
to publicly advertise their products on their respective websites, to
create elaborate marketing campaigns targeted towards an elite group of
investors, to recruit such investors at industry seminars and meetings,
and to disseminate informative and detailed publications in a variety of
mediums. These new freedoms will essentially allow hedge funds to
communicate with a larger range of prospective investors.
The resulting growth of this new power to advertise will likely be
profound. The freedom to advertise will make it easier for smaller,
emerging funds to more easily access this market.107 The solicitation
(Nov. 4, 1985).
101. Id.
102. Darian Capital Services Blog, Impact of “Private Fund” Advertising, INV. FUND
COMPLIANCE & DISTRIBUTION NEWS (July 16, 2013), http://blog.dariancs.com/2013/07/16/
impact-of-private-fund-advertising.
103. E.F. Hutton & Co., SEC No-Action Letter (Dec. 3, 1985); see also Bateman Eichler, Hill
Richards, SEC No-Action Letter, 1985 WL 55680 (Dec. 3, 1985).
104. Ethan W. Johnson, Hedge Fund Marketing Overview, 7 J. INV. COMPLIANCE, no. 2,
2006, at 48.
105. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2015).
106. IPOnet, SEC No-Action Letter (July 26, 1996).
107. ALI Webinar, Hedge Fund Marketing: Understanding the JOBS Act, AM. L. INST. 6, 7
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ban made it difficult for such funds to effectively compete with their
larger, more established counterparts, many of which have throngs of
investors waiting to invest.108 Under the prior regime, this system of
“paying for access” was often referred to as an “old boys club” that
thrived on insider privilege and exclusivity. 109 Consequently, the
solicitation ban made it difficult for such funds to raise sufficient capital
to access an accredited investor audience. With respect to the larger
funds, this new opportunity for hedge funds to engage in healthy
competition could give the more prominent advisers the tools to
successfully bolster their brands to a wider audience.110 The hedge
fund industry can greatly benefit from these resulting increases to
transparency and competition. Yet, the indirect effects that this
exponential growth could have on the broader retail market remain
subject to further investigation.
C. Liquidity Enhancements
The exemptions provided under Regulation D also mandate
significant liquidity restrictions on shares resold in the secondary
market. More specifically, accredited investors who purchase such
private placement shares are restricted from reselling these shares to
subsequent purchasers.111 From a policy perspective, this restriction
prevents accredited investors from dumping private securities on an
uninformed public.112 If an accredited investor is permitted to freely
(2012), http://thehfa.org/documents/FG/hfa/documents/233881_JOBSact.pdf (“All four panelists
agreed that the JOBS Act will have the greatest effect on emerging managers, including both
small and midsize managers looking for increased exposure and AUM, as well as start-ups.”);
Letter from the Hedge Fund Ass’n to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y of Sec. Exch. Comm’n (June
6, 2012), http://www.sec.gov/comments/jobs-title-ii/jobstitleii-22.pdf; Small and Large Hedge
Fund Managers View JOBS Act Through Different Lens, HEDGE FUND MARKETING ALLIANCE
(July 11, 2012), http://www.hedgefundmarketing.org/small-and-large-hedge-fund-managers-view
-jobs-act-through-different-lens/.
108. Amit Chokshi, Hedge Fund Marketing’s Gray Area, SEEKING ALPHA (Feb. 2, 2010, 2:26
AM), http://seekingalpha.com/article/185671-hedge-fund-marketings-gray-area; Susan Lyon, The
Hedge Fund Advertising Ban Lifted: What Should Investors Know?, NERD WALLET (July 24,
2013),
http://www.nerdwallet.com/blog/investing/2013/sec-hedge-fund-advertising-ban-lifted/
(quoting Peter Turchan, Partner at Ready to Run Designs, “I think that the recent lift will not
cause drastic change to the industry or greatly effect [sic] investors, but will offer lesser known
funds to compete on a larger scale and reach a larger audience of potential investors”).
109. Letter from Tom Dworzanski to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y of Sec. Exch. Comm’n
(June 7, 2012), http://www.sec.gov/comments/jobs-title-ii/jobstitleii-23.pdf.
110. ALI Webinar, supra note 107, at 97–98.
111. 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(c) (2015).
112. Gilligan, Will & Co. v. SEC, 267 F.2d 461, 468 (2d Cir. 1959) (stating that restricting
resales deters the following scenario: “[A] dealer who speculatively purchases an unregistered
security in the hope that the financially weak issuer had, as is stipulated here, ‘turned the corner,’
to unload on the unadvised public what he later determines to be an unsound investment without
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engage in the reselling of private placement securities, then the
subsequent purchasers would not have access to the public disclosures
and protections that would otherwise be available in a registered
offering.113 If an accredited investor does in fact resell private
securities to the general public, such accredited investor could be
deemed an underwriter.114 This would automatically trigger the
registration requirements under the Securities Act and the entire
transaction would lose its Regulation D exemption. 115 An accredited
investor in this scenario could avoid these harsh results by holding the
private securities for at least two years before reselling them, or by
restricting resells to other accredited investors.116
The SEC provided additional clarity to these restrictions when it
promulgated the Rule 144 safe harbor in 1972.117 Rule 144 initially
adopted the common law standard of mandating a holding period of two
years.118 In 1997, however, the SEC reduced the holding period to one
year so that private securities were no longer deemed “restricted” after
complying with this reduced holding period.119 Thus, accredited
investors could freely resell their shares in the secondary market to the
investing public after holding the securities for one year. 120 This
holding period requirement presumes that the accredited investors
purchased such securities with the intent to make a legitimate
investment, as opposed to purchasing with the intent to distribute to the
investing public (by inadvertently acting as an underwriter).121 Rule
144 also clarified when this holding period actually began,122 and
provided additional guidance for any notice or disclosure requirements,
as well as any restrictions on the volume and manner of selling
restricted securities.123
In 2008, the SEC amended Rule 144 to provide accredited investors

the disclosure sought by the securities laws, although it is in precisely such circumstances that
disclosure is most necessary and desirable.”).
113. Id.
114. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(11) (2012).
115. Id.
116. Ackerberg v. Johnson, Jr., 892 F.2d 1328, 1335–37 (8th Cir. 1989).
117. Definition of Terms “Underwriter” and “Brokers’ Transactions,” Securities Act Release
No. 5223 (Jan. 11, 1972).
118. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (2015).
119. STEPHEN J. CHOI & A.C. PRITCHARD, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND ANALYSIS
634 (3rd ed. 2012).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(d)(3).
123. Id. § 230.144(c), (e), (f).
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with even more liquidity for their private placement investments.124
Accredited investors wanted to enjoy the freedoms of quickly reselling
their shares to subsequent purchasers, especially if such investments had
significantly appreciated in value. Profiting from capital appreciation is
one of the primary benefits of owning shares, and loosening the
mandated holding period of private securities could induce greater
investments in private offerings. As such, the 2008 amendments
shortened the required holding period for private investments to six
months.125 Accredited investors no longer had to wait an entire year
before reselling their shares to the investing public.
The SEC completely eliminated the required holding period for a
certain subset of investors when it adopted the Rule 144A safe
harbor.126 Under this rule, accredited investors can immediately resell
their shares a Qualified Institutional Buyer (“QIB”) without being
subject to any mandated holding period.127 QIBs include entities that in
the aggregate, own and invest on a discretionary basis $100 million or
more in securities of companies unaffiliated with QIBs.128 This class of
investors can include qualifying insurance companies, investment
companies, corporations, and partnerships.129 Conceptually, these kinds
of investors should be able to adequately fend for themselves and thus
do not need the protections afforded by a mandated holding period. The
SEC passed this safe harbor after facing growing pressures to expand
the private placement market, which also served to attract foreign
issuers that did not wish to be burdened by the severe liquidity
restrictions placed on private placements previously.130 Many of these
issuers simply decided to offer interests in other countries that had
looser restrictions.131 Rule 144A served to retain or recruit a larger
number of both domestic and foreign issuers to bolster capital formation
in the United States.132
Financial innovation has naturally led to the creation of private
trading platforms, where prequalified accredited investors, and QIBs,

124. Id. § 230.144(d).
125. Id.
126. See generally id. § 230.144A (enumerating such safe harbors).
127. Id. § 230.144A(b), (d).
128. Id. § 230.144A(a)(i).
129. Id.
130. William K. Sjostrom, Jr., The Birth of Rule 144A Equity Offerings, 56 UCLA L. REV.
409, 411 (2008).
131. Paul G. Mahoney, Regulation of International Securities Issues, 14 CATO REV. BUS. &
GOV’T 62, 64 (1991).
132. Id.
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can freely trade restricted securities.133 Before these trading platforms
existed, such investors faced challenges in identifying willing buyers
and sellers of private securities even if no holding period was required.
On March 5, 2014, NASDAQ announced the launching of a new trading
platform, the NASDAQ Private Market.134 Various categories of
private issuers, such as hedge funds, venture capital funds, and general
private placements, can become members of this new platform.135 Once
a private issuer becomes a member, its underlying investors can
exchange shares with other investors via this new exchange.136 The
NASDAQ press release provides,
“We are excited to officially open NASDAQ Private Market for
business,” said Greg Brogger, President of NASDAQ Private Market.
“We listened to the needs of private growth companies and developed
NASDAQ Private Market to serve as a fully integrated end-to-end
solution for managing their equity functions. NASDAQ Private
Market will bring liquidity, efficiency and control to private
companies. Member broker-dealers and their investor clients will
benefit from greater access to financial information, transaction flow
and liquidity.”137

In effect, these platforms, or exchanges, are making it easier for
private issuers to attract a greater number of investors as they can now
promise such investors the freedom to easily trade their shares.
The loosening of the liquidity constraints provided under safe harbors
144 and 144A, coupled with the creation of private exchanges and
trading platforms for restricted securities, will likely facilitate an even
greater expansion of the private fund industry. Immediate liquidity was
previously the distinguishing characteristic of registered investment
companies, since mutual funds are obligated to honor purchases and
redemptions on a daily basis.138 As immediate liquidity becomes easier
for private investment companies to guarantee, they will be more
appealing to a larger group of accredited investors. This could in turn
lead to a decreased demand for mutual fund investments.

133. See generally Rodrigues, supra note 38 (providing analysis of burgeoning secondary
markets for private placement shares).
134. NASDAQ Private Market Launches New Marketplace for Private Companies, NASDAQ
(Mar. 5, 2014), http://ir.nasdaqomx.com/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID=830434.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. 17 C.F.R. § 270.22c-1(b) (2015); see also Invest Wisely: An Introduction to Mutual
Funds, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/inwsmf.htm (last updated
July 2, 2008) (“Mutual fund investors can readily redeem their shares at the current NAV—plus
any fees and charges assessed on redemption-at any time.”).
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D. Exchange Act Registration
The Exchange Act was passed in 1934.139 While the Securities Act
mandates detailed disclosure requirements for an initial public offering
(“IPO”) (the primary capital market), the Exchange Act creates
additional disclosure obligations for shares traded on the secondary
market.140 Once an issuer, or underwriter acting on the issuer’s behalf,
sells the full allotment of shares in an IPO, the disclosure obligations
provided under the Securities Act no longer apply. Even still, once
these same IPO shares enter the secondary market where investors are
trading shares amongst each other, the ongoing disclosure and reporting
obligations under the Exchange Act are automatically triggered.141
Public companies must comply with these periodic disclosure
requirements for at least one year following their effective registration
date.142 The ongoing disclosure obligations include the public filing of
annual and quarterly reports (Forms 10-K and 10-Q, respectively),
which contain any material information related to the underlying
company as well as annual and interim financial statements.143
Companies must also provide close to real-time disclosure of specified
material events provided in the Form 8-K.144
In 1964, Congress expanded the Exchange Act’s scope of what
constituted a “public company” under its provisions by adopting Section
12(g).145 This new provision sought to incorporate a larger range of
companies that had a substantial impact on interstate commerce, even if
such companies did not directly engage in a registered IPO. 146 The
registration requirements under Section 12(g) are triggered based on the
size and impact of the company. 147 More specifically, any company
that held at least $10 million in total assets and offered interests to 500
shareholders of record for any class of equity securities had to register
under the Exchange Act.148 Section 12(g) pulled many large private
companies into the Exchange Act’s regulatory rubric. With respect to
the hedge fund industry, while many funds successfully maintained
139. Sec. Exch. Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a (2012).
140. Id. § 78l.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. § 78m.
144. Id.
145. Id. § 78l.
146. CHOI & PRITCHARD, supra note 119, at 172.
147. See generally Donald C. Langevoort & Robert B. Thompson, “Publicness” in
Contemporary Securities Regulation After the JOBS Act, 101 GEO. L.J. 337, 386 (2013)
(explaining specific contours of Section 12(g) requirements and corresponding exemptions).
148. 15 U.S.C. § 78l.
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exemptions under the Securities Act and the Company Act, if a
particular fund grew to at least $10 million (which was more likely than
not) and held at least 500 investors, it would have to register under the
Exchange Act.149 To avoid this scenario, many funds simply restricted
their funds to 499 investors or less.150
In 2012, the JOBS Act retooled Section 12(g) to make it easier for
private companies to avoid the cumbersome and costly registration
requirements under the Exchange Act.151 The amendment increased the
500-shareholder registration threshold to 2000 shareholders (or 500
unaccredited investors).152 Thus, companies can now offer interests to
1999 investors without having to comply with the periodic disclosure
requirements mandated under the Exchange Act.153 With respect to the
private fund industry, these vehicles can now recruit 1999 accredited
investors and still maintain exemptions under the Securities Act, the
Company Act (Section 3(c)(7)), and the recently revised Exchange
Act.154 Many private funds will likely take advantage of this new
flexibility to recruit a larger number of investors without having to file
periodic reports with the SEC.
Overall, the current regulatory climate seems to support the
expansion of the private fund industry. Provisions under the JOBS Act
reversed the advertising ban for private companies and increased the
investor threshold for registration under the Exchange Act. Private fund
advisers will now be able to market their products in the public sphere,
although they can more easily avoid being identified as a “public”
company under the Exchange Act. Liquidity for private shares has also
been enhanced through the expansion of safe harbors provided under
the Securities Act, and through the development of private exchanges
where investors can more easily liquidate their investments. It is
difficult to predict with certainty the full impact that these regulatory
developments will have on future growth of hedge funds, private equity
funds, and other pooled investment vehicles that are reserved for elite
investors. Yet, given the increasing difficulties of “beating the market”
through the restrictive strategies that constrain public companies (as will

149. SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 60, at 13.
150. Id.
151. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 501, 126 Stat. 306, 325
(2012); see also 15 U.S.C. § 78l(g)(1)(A).
152. Martin E. Lybecker, The Effect of the JOBS Act on Private Investment Companies:
Foreseen Consequences, A.B.A. (May 2012), http://www.americanbar.org/publications/blt/2012/
05/06_lybecker.html.
153. Id.
154. Id.
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be further discussed in subsequent Parts), issuers are more likely to take
advantage of the flexibilities associated with launching a private fund.
This growth could arguably benefit the elite class of investors by
creating a more competitive, transparent, and liquid market. However,
the long-term impact on the retail investor population has yet to be
sufficiently investigated. The remaining Parts of this Article seek to at
least begin this discussion with a summary of the practical and
theoretical implications that this burgeoning industry will have for
investments available to the general public.
II. TALENT DRAIN
This Part begins by identifying the various ways in which adviser
skill is measured. Education, past experience, and more importantly,
the ability to generate consistent alpha, are all specific factors utilized in
evaluating adviser talent. Part II then illustrates how the expansion of
the private fund industry could drain superior talent from the mutual
fund industry, leaving the general public with subpar management.
This is compounded by the already limited incentives that public fund
advisers have with respect to selecting optimal investments and
receiving optimal fees.
A. Measuring Adviser Skill
Mutual funds are typically managed by an investment adviser entity
that is registered under the Advisers Act.155 This entity is considered
the “brain” of the fund as it is responsible for developing and
implementing its underlying investment strategy. 156 These specialized
strategies are presumably the most important characteristic of a fund as
they hold the key to earning a sizable return for a large group of
investors. Mutual fund strategies are typically comprised of a variety of
equities, bonds, and cash instruments, which are bought and sold by
advisers in order to earn returns for investors.157 Determining whether
a manager can effectually administer its underlying strategy is
paramount to deciding whether to invest in a particular fund.
The specific individuals responsible for this imperative function are
known as the portfolio managers. Unique talents of such managers can
be measured by a variety of factors such as educational pedigree and

155. MUTUAL FUND GUIDE, supra note 48, at 6.
156. Id. (noting that mutual fund advisers are also subject to oversight by the board of
directors, which helps mitigate potential conflicts of interest between the fund and the adviser).
157. Id. at 7.
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previous experience managing comparable investment products.158
Investors can also investigate any prior lawsuits or enforcement actions
that have been instituted against a particular adviser or portfolio
manager.159 Since mutual fund advisers are required to register under
the Advisers Act, much of this information can be found in the publicly
available Form ADV.160 This form includes descriptions of the
advisory services offered, material conflicts of interest, any pending
disciplinary actions, advisory fees charged, and other general business
descriptions.161
Although these characteristics are extremely important in evaluating
the perceived talent of a particular adviser, investors tend to focus on an
adviser’s ability to generate alpha, which is the excess return a fund
earns relative to a specified benchmark, such as the S&P 500 Index.162
Generally speaking, alpha “is often considered to represent the value
that a portfolio manager adds to or subtracts from a fund’s return.”163
Investors can use the mandated performance data provided in a fund’s
publicly available prospectus to calculate alpha and further investigate
how a particular fund has performed relative to comparable products or
vehicles.164 A portfolio manager’s ability to pick the ideal basket of
securities, as well as to know when to buy and sell such securities (to
profit from capital appreciation), largely dictates whether a fund will be
profitable.165
158. Protect Your Money: Check Out Brokers and Investment Advisers, U.S. SEC. & EXCH.
COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/investor/brokers.htm (last visited Sept. 8, 2015).
159. Id.
160. Id.; see also Form ADV, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/answers
/formadv.htm (last visited Sept. 8, 2015) (“Form ADV is the uniform form used by investment
advisers to register with both the SEC and state securities authorities. The form consists of two
parts. Part 1 requires information about the investment adviser’s business, ownership, clients,
employees, business practices, affiliations, and any disciplinary events of the adviser or its
employees . . . . Part 2 requires investment advisers to prepare narrative brochures written in
plain English that contain information such as the types of advisory services offered, the adviser’s
fee schedule, disciplinary information, conflicts of interest, and the educational and business
background of management and key advisory personnel of the adviser.”).
161. See Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b–4 (c)(1)(A) (2006 & Supp. 2010) (explaining
the requirements for record keeping and maintenance in order to comply with the Commission).
162. INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/a/alpha.asp (last visited Sept. 8,
2015).
163. Id.
164. MUTUAL FUND GUIDE, supra note 48, at 17–19. It should, however, be noted that past
performance is not necessarily indicative of future results. There is an ongoing risk that the
adviser will not be able to replicate past performance. Id.
165. Mutual Funds, FIN. INDUSTRY REG. AUTHORITY, http://www.finra.org/investors/mutualfunds (last visited Sept. 8, 2015) (“[W]hen the fund’s underlying stocks or bonds pay income
from dividends or interest, the fund pays those profits, after expenses, to its shareholders in
payments known as income distributions. . . . [W]hen the fund has capital gains from selling
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B. Limited Incentives of Mutual Fund Advisers: Stock Picking
Numerous commentators have queried whether mutual fund advisers
are sufficiently talented to effectively generate returns over time.166
Many have come to the troubling conclusion that the profits earned by
advisers, if any, are solely attributable to luck.167 This is consistent
with the efficient market hypothesis, which posits that all publicly
available information regarding a particular security is automatically
impounded into its price.168 Pursuant to this theory, traders cannot
expect to consistently earn profits by reacting to newly released
information related to their holdings. Such advisers simply collect
handsome fees from investors, without having the means to actually
beat the markets on a consistent basis. In contrast, a more recent study
found that mutual fund advisers did in fact rely on unique skills such as
stock picking and market timing to consistently create value for
investors.169 This study concluded that “the average mutual fund adds
value by extracting about $2 million a year from financial markets . . . .
Funds that have added value in the past keep adding value in the future,
for as long as 10 years.”170 The study also found “that investors
recognize this skill and reward it by investing more capital with better
funds.”171
The inconsistencies of these findings are attributable to a variety of
factors, one of which relates to the different metrics used to measure
adviser skill.172
Thus, determining whether fund advisers can
investments in its portfolio at a profit, it passes on those after-expense profits to shareholders as
capital gains distributions.”).
166. See generally Rodrigues, supra note 38 (discussing the implications of the disparities in
the growing income gap).
167. Id.
168. John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure
System, 70 VA. L. REV. 717, 737 (1984); Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The
Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549 (1984); Jeffrey N. Gordon & Lewis A.
Kornhauser, Efficient Markets, Costly Information, and Securities Research, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV.
761, 763 (1985).
169. Jonathan B. Berk & Jules H. van Binsbergen, Measuring Skill in the Mutual Fund
Industry, 118 J. FIN. ECON. (forthcoming 2015–16).
170. Id. (manuscript at 1).
171. Id.
172. See Malcolm Baker et al., Can Mutual Fund Managers Pick Stocks? Evidence from
Their Trades Prior to Earnings Announcements, 45 J. FIN & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS, 1111
(explaining that stock-picking skill of mutual fund managers are based on the earnings
announcement returns of the stocks that they hold and trade); see also Jonathan B. Berk, Five
Myths of Active Portfolio Management, 31 J. OF PORTFOLIO MGMT. 27, 31 (2005) (“[R]eturns
cannot be used to measure managerial skill. Because researchers generally use return to measure
skill, they have drawn the erroneous conclusion that active managers add little value.”); Berk &
van Binsbergen, supra note 169, manuscript at 1–2 (states the following regarding the various
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consistently beat the markets is a highly contested topic that warrants
further analysis.173 This Article does not attempt to provide a definitive
answer to this perpetual debate, but it does highlight how the capital
restrictions provided under the Company Act present yet an additional
barrier for mutual funds to consistently beat the markets. More
specifically, mutual fund advisers are subject to a complex web of
capital restrictions under the Company Act, which limits the kinds of
instruments and strategies that an adviser can select for potential
investment opportunities.174 Mutual funds are therefore restricted to
securities, bonds, and cash instruments.175
Advisers’ talent is
essentially limited to a narrow slice of the total universe of investments.
If advisers had more freedoms to transact in derivatives and other
innovative financial products, they could perhaps be better incentivized
to extend their stock-picking and market-timing skills to a larger variety
of instruments. Having greater access to these instruments could also
help advisers ensure returns in declining markets, and develop more
innovative techniques for actually beating the market on a consistent
basis. The limitations provided under the Company Act also narrow
advisers’ view of the interconnectedness of the markets. Further, an indepth understanding of the relationship between certain derivatives and
securities markets could perhaps enhance the abilities of advisers to
better predict market movements.
It should however be noted that the Company Act was originally
designed to restrict such access to innovative products because they can
expose the general public to excessive losses.176 Increased returns
generally result from increased risks and the federal securities laws are
fundamentally designed to protect the general public against excessive
harms. Because derivatives are inherently leveraged financial products,
trading in these instruments can result in losses that far exceed the
metrics used to measure alpha: “prior studies have used the net alpha to investors, i.e., the average
abnormal return net of fees and expenses, to assess whether or not managers have skill . . . .
Some people have hypothesized . . . that the gross alpha . . . (the average abnormal return before
fees are subtracted) would be the correct measure of managerial skill. . . . We argue that the skill
of a mutual fund manager equals the value his fund extracts from markets.”).
173. Berk & van Binsbergen, supra note 169, manuscript at 1 (“[A]n extensive literature in
financial economics has focused on the question of whether stock picking or market timing talent
exists. Interestingly, the literature has not been able to provide a definitive answer to this
question.”).
174. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
175. MUTUAL FUND GUIDE, supra note 48, at 7.
176. Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a–1(b)(7). In outlining the policy goals of the
Company Act, Congress declared that “the interest of investors are adversely affected . . . when
investment companies by excessive borrowing and the issuance of excessive amounts of senior
securities increase unduly the speculative character of their junior securities.” Id.
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initial investment that underlies the contract.
Moreover, these
instruments are often highly complex, which makes understanding the
accompanying risks even more difficult. It is undoubtedly arguable that
certain categories of financial innovation should be limited to investors
who could adequately protect themselves from extreme losses.
Even still, simply loosening (not eliminating) the existing caps on
derivatives and leverage could be warranted given the increased need to
diversify investments across a range of instruments and strategies.177
Restricting direct access to financial innovation is becoming harder to
justify as the dividing line between public and private investment
companies has started to erode. More specifically, defined benefit
pension plans have become major investors in the private fund industry
even though retail investors are the underlying constituents of such
plans.178 If the general public has indirect exposure to private funds
through pension plan investments, then it is plausible that mutual funds
should also have comparable access. Mutual funds currently dominate
the investment options available to retail investors through 401(k)s and
other savings vehicles.179 Whereas CalPERS, the California Public
Employees’ Retirement System, recently made the widely known
decision to withdraw its allocations from hedge funds, 180 a recent
survey administered by Quinnipiac University School of Business,
found that institutional investors still largely favor private fund

177. See generally Rodrigues, supra note 38 (discussing the implications of the disparities in
the growing income gap).
178. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, HEDGE FUNDS AND PRIVATE EQUITY INVESTMENTS 4–5 (2011).
179. See JACOB HACKER, THE GREAT RISK SHIFT: THE ASSAULT OF AMERICAN JOBS,
FAMILIES, HEALTH CARE, AND RETIREMENT AND HOW YOU CAN FIGHT BACK 109–35 (2006)
(providing a brief history of the vast brokerage loans and stock purchased between 1927 and
1929, which created the corporate surplus before the Great Depression). Over the past few
decades, many companies have abandoned defined benefit pension plans and have instead opted
for independently managed 401(k)s. Id. at 111. As background, these kinds of plans guarantee a
lifetime stream of fixed payments upon retirement. Such plans have also become major investors
in the private fund universe as ensuring returns in equities markets has become increasingly
difficult. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, supra note 178, at 4–5. However, defined benefit pension plans
(like CalPERS) are a dying breed as employers have opted for the more easily administered
defined contribution plans. HACKER, supra, at 111. These plans, which frequently take the form
of a 401(k), are independently managed by individual employees, who have the freedom to
choose the basket of investments within their portfolios. Id. These plans only guarantee the
amount invested, as well as any resulting profits or losses from the underlying investments.
401(k)s rarely include private funds as available investment options. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, supra
note 178, at 4–9. They are mostly comprised of mutual fund investments. HACKER, supra, at
119.
180. James B. Stewart, Hedge Funds Lose Calpers, and More, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 27, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/27/business/in-calperss-departure-a-watershed-moment-forhedge-funds.html.
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investments.181 This survey gathered responses from institutional
investors that collectively manage $1.12 trillion in assets.182 The
survey yielded the following results:
While our respondents may be bullish on U.S. equities, they do not
plan on allocating additional capital to these managers during the next
year. However, they do wish to increase their allocations to hedge
fund and private equity managers. These anticipated allocation
decisions suggest that the alternative investment industry will continue
to grow into the near future.183

These findings support the notion that investors still seek private fund
investments to diversify their portfolios and maximize returns.
To the extent that a particular strategy could generate excessive
systemic risk, regulators should perhaps subject such funds to
heightened scrutiny that exceeds the existing regulatory framework for
private funds.184 This would entail creating precise measures of
systemic risk, as well as corresponding limitations, that go beyond the
disclosure framework implemented under the Dodd-Frank Act. It is
equally difficult to justify a framework where private entities, with
limited transparency and governance restrictions, have the market
capabilities to create negative externalities that could expose the general
public to harm. And because mutual funds are subject to the detailed
registration requirements under the Company Act (and other
enhancements under the Dodd-Frank Act), they may be better suited to
trade in such risky instruments given the heightened disclosure and
governance requirements that are designed to protect retail investors.
These provisions could serve to mitigate systemic risk as the resulting
transparency can “weed out” trading activities that are in fact harmful to
the broader economy.
One could also argue that contrary to the prior assertions, the steady
growth of the mutual fund industry over the past century proves that
mutual fund advisers are indeed talented. Advisers have indeed been
quite successful in recruiting an ongoing stream of new investors. But
recruiting investors in this regard could be attributed to superior sales
tactics as opposed to having superior talents in optimizing returns. This
is supported by the fact that mutual funds have historically had the

181. See generally QUINNIPIAC UNIV., INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR SURVEY FALL 2014 (2014).
182. Id. at 1.
183. Id. at 3.
184. See generally Martin, Private Investment Companies, supra note 37 (discussing problems
associated with relying on the sophisticated investor exemption to separate private and public
investment companies and queries whether the dividing line should be based on underlying
investment activities as opposed to the status of investors).
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freedom to advertise to the general public, and private funds have not
enjoyed these liberties prior to the passage of the JOBS Act.185 Mutual
fund advisers have entire marketing teams dedicated to generating
advertisements across various media. There are countless commercials,
broadcasts, articles, websites, and pamphlets, all of which urge the
general public to invest in mutual funds.
Professor John Morley of Yale Law School has provided a useful
historical perspective on this topic in his article, Collective Branding
and the Origins of Investment Management Regulation: 1936-1942.186
His research suggests that the early business models of mutual funds
were historically designed to earn profits from new shareholder
investments as opposed to generating profits from existing holdings.187
Because of this early emphasis on sales, the mutual fund industry may
have even advocated for the capital restrictions implemented under the
Company Act as a way to brand the industry as being a relatively safe
investment for the general public.188 These restrictions have likely
made it difficult for the industry to move past this emphasis on sales, as
opposed to focusing on managerial talent in selecting optimal
combinations of underlying instruments.
Given the difficulties of relying on managerial skill to exceed
benchmarks such as the S&P 500 Index, new financial innovations such
as index funds and exchange-traded funds (“ETFs”) have eliminated the
need for managerial talent.189 These strategies rely on computer
programs to directly replicate the basket of securities represented by a
particular index.190 Managers in these vehicles are not actively trading
financial instruments, as they are instead passive monitors of the
underlying computer models. Professor William Birdthistle, an expert
in investment company law, has supported this assertion by arguing that
the recent shortcomings of the mutual fund industry have paved the way
for the advent of ETFs.191 Because advisory fees charged to investors

185. See THOMAS P. LEMKE ET AL., REGULATION OF INVESTMENT COMPANIES §§ 14–22
(2014) (providing detailed description of regulatory framework for advertising by mutual funds,
which includes applicable Company Act provisions, as well as corresponding rules and cases).
186. John Morley, Collective Branding and the Origins of Investment Management
Regulation: 1936–1942, 6 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 341 (2012).
187. Id. at 392.
188. Id. at 391–92.
189. Deloitte Research, Exchange-Traded Funds Challenging the Dominance of Mutual
Funds?, DELOITTE, http://www.runtogold.com/images/Deloitte-ETF-report.pdf (last visited Sept.
8, 2015).
190. Id.
191. See generally William Birdthistle, The Fortunes and Foibles of Exchange-Traded Funds:
A Positive Market Response to the Problems of Mutual Funds, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 69 (2008)
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are necessarily lower with respect to these vehicles, mutual funds have
been steadily losing investors to this growing category of
investments.192
C. Limited Incentives of Mutual Fund Advisers: Fees
Relatedly, advisers who manage hedge funds can earn substantially
higher fees. Hedge fund advisers earn both a performance fee of
approximately 20% of profits, and a management fee of approximately
2% of net assets.193 Mutual fund advisers are prohibited from charging
a performance fee on the profits of a fund and are thus limited to
earning a 1–2% management fee on net assets.194 A number of highprofile mutual fund managers left mutual funds to manage less
restrictive and more lucrative hedge fund investments in 2000.195
During this time period, a handful of managers left prestigious
Fidelity196 funds to start their own hedge fund vehicles, which at the
time was quite controversial.197
Although this restriction on
performance fees is designed to protect retail investors from excessive

(providing a descriptive and detailed discussion on exchange-traded funds, which includes their
structure, advantages, and shortcomings).
192. Trevor Hunnicutt, Investors Shun Stock Pickers, Favor Vanguard, BlackRock, State
Street, INVESTMENTNEWS (Mar. 16, 2015, 12:28 PM), http://www.investmentnews.com/article/
20150316/FREE/150319936/investors-shun-stock-pickers-favor-vanguard-blackrock-state-street;
Chuck Jaffe, Mutual Funds Lose Their Battle with ETFs, MARKETWATCH (June 11, 2011, 1:38
PM), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/mutual-funds-lose-their-battle-with-etfs-2011-06-08.
193. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, SEC Pub. No. 139, INVESTOR BULLETIN: HEDGE
FUNDS (2012); see also JOSEPH G. NICHOLAS, INVESTING IN HEDGE FUNDS: STRATEGIES FOR
THE NEW MARKETPLACE 165 (1st ed. 1999) (providing a brief discussion on hedge funds, which
includes questions to ask to understand the level of risk in the fund’s investment strategies
compared to one’s personal goals).
194. Henry Ordower, The Regulation of Private Equity, Hedge Funds, and State Funds, 58
AM. J. COMP. L. 295, 306 (2010); Mutual Fund Fees and Expenses, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N,
http://www.sec.gov/answers/mffees.htm (last visited Sept. 8, 2014) (providing a brief discussion
on the various fees and expenses of mutual funds).
195. Hedge Fund Hiring: Momentum Continues but Skills Scarce, THINK ADVISOR (Dec. 22,
2003), http://www.thinkadvisor.com/2003/12/22/hedge-fund-hiring-momentum-continues-but-ski
lls-sc; Jennifer Karchmer, Fund Managers Move, CNNMONEY.COM (July 19, 2000 6:20 AM),
http://money.cnn.com/2000/07/19/mutualfunds/q_funds_hedge/index.htm;
Joseph
Nocera,
Punishing Success At Harvard, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 22, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/22
/business/punishing-success-at-harvard.html (stating that top money managers from Harvard
University have resigned in order to reap the benefits of the higher compensation offered by
hedge funds).
196. About Fidelity, FIDELITY, https://www.fidelity.com/about-fidelity/overview (last visited
Sept. 8, 2015) (stating that Fidelity serves “24 million individual customers . . . through 10
regional offices and more than 180 Investor Centers in the United States. With 40,000-plus
associates, our global presence spans eight other countries across North America, Europe, Asia,
and Australia who are also working tirelessly to meet the needs of our customers.”).
197. Karchmer, supra note 195.
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risk taking on the part of their advisers, the promise of higher fees can
lure otherwise talented advisers into the management of private pools.
These incentives (or the lack thereof) are compounded by the current
regulatory climate that eases the process of organizing private funds.
As many of the barriers of entry have recently been lifted under the
JOBS Act, the mutual fund industry could experience a significant
talent drain, particularly since the mutual fund investment climate is
already subject to excessive constraints. A recent empirical study
investigated the extent to which mutual fund talent is being transferred
to the hedge fund industry.198 This study found evidence of “an
increasing flight of top-performing young managers from mutual funds
[to hedge funds], a drop in mutual fund returns, and deterioration in
recruiting standards.”199 Another commentator has observed:
The hedge fund industry continues to grow rapidly. To support this
growth, it is gathering much of its new talent from the mutual fund
industry. Those mutual fund portfolio managers who are most
interested in actually delivering superior investment performance are
migrating to the hedge fund industry. Hedge funds have been able to
attract the best and the brightest—offering them significantly higher
compensation. A surprisingly large brain-drain has resulted, sapping
the strength of the mutual fund industry.200

One could argue that the new regulatory requirements provided under
the Dodd-Frank Act create a substantial barrier to entry for private fund
advisers. The Dodd-Frank Act requires that private advisers register
under the Advisers Act and report certain confidential information
directly to the SEC.201 However, a recent survey conducted by
Professor Wulf Kaal found that although hedge funds expressed
concerns with these new regulatory requirements, the actual costs and
impact of compliance are not as significant as the industry had
originally anticipated.202 Furthermore, the potential for exponential
profits that result from the trading flexibilities of managing such funds
likely far exceeds the incremental costs of complying with the DoddFrank Act. These costs are also significantly less than the costs of
complying with the Securities Act, Company Act, and Exchange Act,
198. Leonard Kostovetsky, Human Capital Flows and the Financial Industry, in EFA 2009
BERGEN MEETINGS PAPER (2009), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1013421.
199. Id. at 1.
200. Rob Brown, The Death of Mutual Fund Wrap, RIA CENT. (Aug. 27, 2012), www.ria
central.com/2012/08/27/death-mutual-fund-wrap.
201. See Dodd-Frank Act, §§ 403, 404, 124 Stat. 1376, 1571 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 80b–3(b) (2012)).
202. Wulf Kaal, Hedge Fund Manager Registration Under the Dodd-Frank Act, 50 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 243, 315 (2013).
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all of which provide lenient exemptions for private funds.
III. PRIVILEGED ACCESS TO STRATEGIES
This Part first provides a detailed description of the specific capital
restrictions promulgated under the Company Act. Limitations with
respect to leverage and derivatives trading have been implemented
under this legislation. Part III then identifies the inaccessible strategies
that have been created by this framework. Private funds can access an
abundance of instruments and strategies that simply are unavailable to
their mutual fund counterparts. These strategies can often guarantee
returns despite declining markets. This Part concludes by assessing
how both private adviser talent and unique relationships with
counterparties have allowed advisers to have privileged access to
information. It references and summarizes numerous studies that have
effectually proved privileged access to information for at least certain
categories of hedge fund investments.
A. Mutual Fund Restrictions
The Company Act is distinguishable from the Securities and
Exchange acts in that it goes beyond the “truth in securities” framework
that exclusively relies on the disclosure of material information.203 This
legislation includes strict capital restrictions on the underlying assets of
registered funds by prohibiting or restraining certain types of investment
activities and transactions that are found to expose investors to undue
risk.204 Because our country was founded upon principles of capitalism
and free market, where businesses have the freedom to transact with
minimal interference from the government, these kinds of restrictions
typically elicit significant pushback from the business community. Yet,
the events that led to the Great Depression proved that the government
had to play a larger role in regulating the markets to prevent the
devastating abuses that crippled the financial system. 205 In fact, these
abuses led to a severe contraction of business in this country, which in
turn led to widespread unemployment for millions of Americans.206
203. The Laws That Govern the Securities Industry, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N,
http://www.sec.gov/about/laws.shtml (last visited Sept. 8, 2015).
204. See generally LEMKE ET AL., supra note 185, § 8 (providing a detailed description of the
regulatory framework underlying mutual fund capital restrictions, which includes applicable
Company Act provisions, as well as corresponding rules and cases).
205. See RALPH F. DE BEDTS, THE NEW DEAL’S SEC: THE FORMATIVE YEARS 7–10 (1964)
(providing a discussion of government programs, such as the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act (“ERISA”) and Social Security, which prevent risky retirement investments by
creating strict rules to ensure that workers are guaranteed their full benefits).
206. Id.
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With respect to the investment company industry, the SEC estimated
that between 1929 and 1936 “investment company shareholders lost 40
per cent of their investments” due to various abuses that infected the
market at that time.207 Unscrupulous advisers were found to have used
funds as “dumping grounds” for unmarketable securities, as vehicles to
earn excessive returns based on shoddy investments, and as an
unlimited pool of leverage for their own personal gain.208 Many used
the lax regulatory environment to operate funds as Ponzi schemes,
where instead of implementing a legitimate investment strategy,
advisers relied on new investments to fund their excessive fees. 209
Because investment companies attract a significant portion of the
national savings from the general public, the trading activities of such
vehicles could have a vital effect on capital formation within the
broader economy. Thus, these provisions are designed to mitigate the
abuses that led to the severe losses for a wide range of investment
company investors.
Section 18 under the Company Act provides the basic framework for
these restrictions.210 This provision prohibits investment companies
from issuing “senior securities” to investors, which are defined broadly
to include any obligation constituting indebtedness on behalf of the
fund.211 This severely restricts the amount of debt that a fund can carry.
For example, taking out a loan to bolster fund returns would
automatically constitute a senior security interest as the bank
counterparty would be offered a promissory note, bonds, or shares in
exchange for the specified amount of the loan. 212 Section 18(f),
however, allows open-ended funds to borrow capital from a bank if,
immediately after the bank borrowing, the fund’s total net assets are at
least three times the total aggregate borrowings (300% asset
coverage).213 If a fund borrows $300 for example, then it must have at
least $900 of total assets to cover this loan. If at any time asset
coverage falls below 300%, the company must, within three days,
reduce its borrowings until it has 300% coverage.214
207. Paul Roye, Dir., Div. of Inv. Mgmt., Speech at U.S. Security & Exchange Commission,
A Celebration of the 60th Anniversary of the Investment Company Act (Oct. 4, 2000) (transcript
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch405.htm).
208. Richard M. Phillips & Robert G. Bagnall, The Investment Company Act of 1940: A Time
For Reassessment, in 2 22ND ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION 593, 596 (1990).
209. Id.
210. Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a–18 (2012).
211. Id. § 80a–18(a), (g).
212. Id. § 80a–18(c).
213. Id. § 80a–18(f).
214. Id. § 80a–18(f)(1).
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Trading in derivatives can also constitute indebtedness and therefore
run afoul of Section 18 of the Company Act.215 This is because in order
to trade derivatives, parties must post margin or collateral at the outset
of the transaction (and for the duration of the transaction), since one
party will inevitably incur losses once the transaction closes. 216
Derivatives are not specifically defined under the federal securities
laws, but in their most basic form, they are contracts between a future
buyer and future seller that specify a future price at which some item
can or must be sold.217 Common examples include forwards, futures,
swaps, and options.
The Company Act does provide some leeway for derivatives trading
by registered funds. The SEC will not automatically treat derivatives as
senior securities provided that the adviser takes certain steps to limit the
potential for leveraged losses by “covering” their obligations.218 Fund
advisers can “cover” derivative contracts by earmarking or segregating
liquid securities equal in value to the fund’s potential exposure from the
leveraged transaction.219
Assets set aside must be liquid,
unencumbered, and marked to market daily.220 They may not be used
to cover other obligations, and, if disposed of, they must be replaced.221
Advisers can also cover an obligation by directly owning the instrument
underlying that obligation.222 For instance, a fund that wants to take a
short position in a certain stock can comply with the Company Act by
owning an equivalent long position in that stock.223 Thus, if a particular
fund wants to engage in a short trade by borrowing 500 shares of
Microsoft, which has a total value of $5000, the fund can maintain
appropriate coverage by directly owning 500 shares of Microsoft, or by
segregating liquid assets in the amount of $5000 until it repays its 500
shares of Microsoft. These transactions must also be closely monitored
by boards of directors and funds must consistently assess accuracy and
completeness of their disclosure relating to derivatives.224

215. LEMKE ET AL., supra note 185, § 8(b)(ii).
216. Id.
217. MICHAEL DURBIN, ALL ABOUT DERIVATIVES 3 (2006).
218. Securities Trading Practices of Registered Investment Companies, 44 Fed. Reg. 25,132
(April 27, 1979) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 271 (2015)).
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Dreyfus Strategic Investing & Dreyfus Strategic Income, SEC Staff No-Action Letter
(June 22, 1987).
223. Id.
224. Securities Trading Practices of Registered Investment Companies, 44 Fed. Reg. at
25,133.
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These exemptions allow advisers to allocate a portion of fund assets
to derivative instruments, but they are still considerably restrictive.
Maintaining a large portion of cash reserves to cover any and all
potential losses, as briefly discussed above, is simply not a viable
investment scheme for most vehicles. The majority of fund assets
should be invested in specific instruments as opposed to sitting in an
earmarked account. As such, these stringent requirements make it
difficult for advisers to rely on derivatives as a primary component of
their strategies and they are often used for narrow hedging purposes.
Derivatives such as futures and forwards can be used to lock in various
exchange rates, to guarantee that a particular interest rate will be at a
certain amount at a specified date in the future, or for a number of other
peripheral strategies.225 Some advisers rely on derivatives to a greater
extent to mimic the absolute return strategies of many private funds. 226
Yet, the general effectiveness of these strategies is quite limited due to
the restrictions provided under Section 18 of the Company Act.227
In addition, illiquid instruments such as distressed securities, venture
capital, private equity, and other private investments are largely
unavailable to public funds. The SEC recommends that registered
investment companies limit such illiquid investments to a maximum of
15% of a fund’s total Net Asset Value (“NAV”)228 so that funds can
easily honor investor redemption requests on a daily basis.229 When
advisers receive redemptions, the adviser must be able to quickly sell a
proportionate amount of mutual fund assets in order to fulfill the request
in a timely fashion.230 Thus, underlying assets must be sufficiently
liquid in order to fund any and all investor redemptions. Maintaining
this flexibility is likely rooted in investor protection, as ensuring that
investors can quickly exit a fund protects them from having their capital
locked within a particular vehicle for an extended period of time.
Many funds further limit illiquid investments to an even lower level
than the allowable 15% due to challenges in complying with the
225. LEMKE ET AL., supra note 185, §8(b)(iii).
226. Simeon Hyman, Hedge Funds for the Masses? Hedge Fund Strategies Are Showing Up
in More Mutual Funds, USNEWS (June 10, 2013, 9:35 AM), http://money.usnews.com/money/
blogs/the-smarter-mutual-fund-investor/2013/06/10/hedge-funds-for-the-masses.
227. Id.
228. Periodic Repurchases by Closed-End Management Investment Companies, Securities
Act Release No. 33,6948, Exchange Act Release No. 34, 30967, 57 Fed. Reg. 34,701 (July 28,
1992).
229. Id.
230. 17 C.F.R. § 270.22c-1(b) (2015); see also Invest Wisely, supra note 138 (“Mutual fund
investors can readily redeem their shares at the current NAV—plus any fees and charges assessed
on redemption—at any time.”).
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mandated valuation mechanisms provided under the Company Act.231
More specifically, since there are no readily available market quotations
for illiquid instruments, advisers must value them at their “fair value as
determined in good faith by the board of directors.”232 The process
through which fair value is determined is often subjective and complex.
Boards can be overly conservative in valuing illiquid instruments, incur
additional expenses in valuing such assets due to their underlying
complexities (which get passed down to the investors), or are exposed
to the risk of liability for mispricing a particular asset.233
The capital restrictions described above, have narrowed the universe
of available strategies for public funds. Mutual fund strategies are
largely restricted to the following three categories of investments:
equities, bonds, and cash instruments. Managerial talent can only go so
far when advisers are limited to this constrained pool of options. This
has arguably paved the way for ETFs to increasingly dominate the
mutual fund landscape as these passive strategies often mirror the
basket of securities represented by an index. Given the massive
financial innovation that has occurred over the past decades, coupled
with the growing flexibilities afforded to private funds, it is increasingly
troubling that the general public has been excluded from a variety of
investments and strategies since the passage of the federal securities
laws.
B. Inaccessible Strategies
Private investment companies that effectively maintain exemptions
from the Company Act are not shackled by this restrictive legislation.
Congress made it easier to maintain such exemptions when it adopted
Section 3(c)(7) in 1996.234 Under this provision, funds that restrict their
offerings to “qualified purchasers” are automatically exempt from the
act.235 This exemption quickly became the most popular amongst
private fund advisers as it allows them to raise an unlimited amount of
capital and still offer interests to an unlimited number of qualified
purchasers. Conceptually, qualified purchasers are similar to accredited
231. Sam Diedrich, ‘Alternative’ or ‘Hedged’ Mutual Funds: What Are They, How Do They
Work, and Should You Invest?, FORBES (Feb. 28, 2014, 10:29 AM), http://www.forbes.com/
sites/samdiedrich/2014/02/28/alternative-or-hedged-mutual-funds-what-are-they-how-do-they-wo
rk-and-should-you-invest; Eleanor Laise, Mutual Funds Delve into Private Equity, PITT. POSTGAZETTE (Aug. 2, 2006), http://www.post-gazette.com/business/businessnews/2006/08/02/Mut
ual-funds-delve-into-privateequity/stories/200608020156.
232. Company Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a–2(41)(B)(ii) (2012).
233. See generally Roye, supra note 207.
234. Company Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a–3(c)(1), (7).
235. Id. § 80a–3(c)(7).
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investors insofar as income or institutional status or both are used as
primary determinants. But qualified purchasers are subject to higher net
worth requirements.236 While individual investors must earn over
$200,000 in order to qualify as accredited, a qualified purchaser
includes institutions that own at least $5,000,000 in investments as well
as any natural person who owns not less than $5,000,000 in
investments.237 If funds restrict offerings to these high net worth
investors then they are afforded more flexibility to invest in a wider
range of instruments than registered investment companies.
Theoretically, these freedoms arise from the notion that these kinds of
investors do not need the investor protection measures mandated under
our federal securities laws. They can adequately fend for themselves
and can therefore bear the increased risk of investing in assets that
perhaps yield less predictable results.
The greater investment freedoms afforded to private funds are often
implicit in their commonly known monikers. With respect to hedge
funds, the term “hedge” refers to the fact that advisers can use a variety
of strategies in order to aggressively hedge, or protect, their portfolios
against market losses, which is a strategy not available to mutual
funds.238 For example, a hedge fund adviser could simultaneously take
long and short positions in the same type of instrument, without having
to comply with the Section 18 restrictions provided above, in order to
ensure a return in both high and low markets.239 Because hedge funds
are not subject to constraints on leverage 240 or derivatives trading,241
such advisers can rely on a plethora of exotic instruments, illiquid
investments, and non-U.S. opportunities, so as to maximize investor
returns. Hedge funds are frequently the leaders in extracting the
benefits of financial innovation as they attract the best managerial talent
to take advantage of these broad liberties. They are habitually described
as having the ability to earn “absolute returns” which means that they
seek to guarantee returns irrespective of market performance.242
236. Id. § 80a–2 (51).
237. Id.
238. NICHOLAS, supra note 193, at 15.
239. Id.
240. Leverage Definition, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/l/leverage.asp
(last visited Sept. 8, 2015) (defining leverage as “the use of various financial instruments or
borrowed capital, such as margin, to increase the potential return of an investment”).
241. REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S WORKING GROUP ON FINANCIAL MARKETS, HEDGE
FUNDS, LEVERAGE, AND THE LESSONS OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT 12 (Apr. 28,
1999). The amount of leverage employed by a particular hedge fund is only limited to the extent
requested by its actual counterparties. Id.
242. See SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 60, at 33–36 (explaining several investment
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Strategies include market neutral, global macro, opportunistic, emerging
markets, and distressed securities.243
With respect to private equity and venture capital funds, these
vehicles typically invest in an assortment of private companies and
investments. These can include start-ups, leveraged buyouts, mezzanine
financing, and distressed companies, among others.244 Because private
fund advisers are not obliged to fulfill daily redemption requests, and
are even able to suspend redemptions at their election, they can invest in
instruments that are highly illiquid as investor subscriptions can be
locked into private vehicles for an extended period of time.245
Moreover, because exempt vehicles are not subject to the mandated
valuation constraints provided under the Company Act, advisers have
complete discretion to utilize internal valuation policies, without being
subject to the independent oversight of a board of directors.246 Private
fund advisers are also exempt from the standardized valuation policies
mandated under the Company Act,247 and they can deviate from any
provided valuation policies when deemed necessary. 248
Such
flexibilities allow private funds to invest in a variety of illiquid
instruments without facing the same liability risks as mutual fund
boards.
A common investment for private equity and venture capital funds is
restricted shares, which are exclusively offered by private companies
such as the pre-IPO Facebook or Microsoft. Generally speaking,
restricted shares are considered illiquid because they are not publicly
traded on active exchanges, making it more difficult to appropriately
derive consistent and reliable valuations. Although restricted shares are
typically offered at a discount relative to post-IPO offerings,249 they are
largely unavailable to mutual fund advisers due to the difficulties in
producing “fair value” determinations, and mandated SEC limitations
described herein. This allows private fund advisers to exclusively enjoy

strategies that hedge funds utilize to generate returns in various market conditions).
243. Dion Friedland, Synopsis of Hedge Fund Strategies, MAGNUM FUNDS,
http://www.magnum.com/hedgefunds/strategies.asp (last visited Sept. 8, 2015).
244. LEMKE ET AL., supra note 75, §12.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. See Ryan Sklar, Hedges or Thickets: Protecting Investors from Hedge Fund Managers’
Conflicts of Interest, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 3251, 3268 (2009).
248. Id. at 3268–69.
249. Dr. Janet Kilholm Smith et al., The SEC’s ‘Fair Value’ Standard for Mutual Fund
Investment in Restricted Shares and Other Illiquid Securities, 6 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L.
421, 439 (summarizing empirical evidence that finds “on average the discounts [of private
placement shares] relative to registered shares is substantial”).
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the informational advantages that are often attributed to being an early
investor in private companies.
For instance, many commentators alleged that private investors in
Facebook, who purchased restricted shares before the company went
public, wrongfully reaped the benefits of having inequitable access to
information related to the company’s true valuation with respect to its
ongoing technological developments.250 These elite investors were able
to cash out their investments when the IPO price reached its peak, while
the general public suffered massive losses due to inaccurate disclosures
related to Facebook’s valuation.251 As one commentator noted: “The
early bird gets the cheap stock; the late bird gets the bird.”252
According to the Private Equity Quarterly Index (“PrEQIn”), private
equity funds, on average, have outperformed the markets over the past
ten years.253 The exclusion of public investors from the private
placement market is becoming less justifiable particularly with the
development of private exchanges such as SecondPost and the
NASDAQ Private Market, which are making restricted shares a more
liquid investment.254
The diversity of instruments and strategies available to private funds
is astounding compared to the narrow universe offered to the general
public. Modern portfolio theory dictates that maintaining a diverse
basket of investments is essential for optimizing investor returns.255
Given the inequitable structure of our federal securities laws, elite
investors disproportionately reap the benefits of this assorted selection
of both short-term and long-term investments. Mutual fund advisers are
admittedly required to maintain a diverse basket of securities under the

250. Henry Blodget, The Full Story Of How Facebook IPO Buyers Got Screwed, BUS.
INSIDER (Dec. 20, 2012, 1:38 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/how-facebook-ipo-investorsgot-screwed-2012-12?op=1; Aswath Damodaran, Was Facebook’s Botched IPO a Conspiracy?,
CNN (May 28, 2012, 11:51 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/05/28/opinion/damodaran-facebookipo/index.html; Elizabeth Ody & Margaret Collins, Facebook IPO Seen Deepening Investor
Distrust of Stocks, BLOOMBERG (May 25, 2012, 11:01 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
2012-05-25/facebook-ipo-fallout-deepens-investor-distrust-of-stocks.html.
251. See generally Blodget, supra note 250; Damodaran, supra note 250; Ody & Collins,
supra note 250.
252. Robert Lezner, The Facebook IPO Proves The New Rule That Private Markets Trump
Public Markets, FORBES (Aug. 19, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/robertlenzner/2012/08/19/
the-facebook-ipo-proves-the-new-rule-that-private-markets-get-the-best-deal.
253. 2014 PREQIN GLOBAL PRIVATE EQUITY REPORT, supra note 73, at 7.
254. See generally Rodrigues, supra note 38 (discussing recent emergence of exchanges for
private shares).
255. Charles Rotblut, The Benefits of Modern Portfolio Theory, AAII J.,
http://www.aaii.com/journal/article/the-benefits-of-modern-portfolio-theory.touch (last visited
Sept. 8, 2015).
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Company Act and the Internal Revenue Code.
Yet numerous
commentators have noted the valid limitations of simply diversifying
among publicly traded stocks in terms of maximizing returns and
minimizing risks. As one prominent hedge fund adviser noted:
Hedge funds strive to generate returns that have a very low correlation
with traditional asset classes . . . . Meaning, that those asset classes
with diverse correlations will not all react in the same manner to
market conditions . . . . Since many well-managed hedge funds act
independently of market movements, they often have the ability to
stabilize a portfolio during times of market uncertainty. This may be
the strongest argument for giving hedge funds a significant role in
your asset allocation. Whereas mutual funds provide a certain degree
of diversification by investing in multiple stocks, they are still subject
to cyclical, sector and asset class volatility and overall market
declines.256

By and large, private funds have the power to invest in assets that are
negatively correlated to publicly traded stocks.257 When market indices
experience volatility due to financial crises or other economic shocks, a
portfolio that includes a sizable allocation to private funds can maintain
smoother returns.258
During the Great Recession, certain hedge funds relied on their
increased freedoms to engage in short trading and other innovative
strategies to actually beat the market.259 In some cases, private funds
were able to earn a sizable return for their underlying investors when
the general public suffered average losses of over 40%.260 The global
macro funds managed by George Soros gained 5% during the lowest
points of the financial crisis.261 As Professor Houman Shadab has
noted in his often-cited research, “[h]edge funds use short sales and
derivatives to manage risk and reduce losses when the overall market is
performing poorly. This practice is difficult for mutual funds because
the legal restrictions on their investment activities.”262 Consequently,
more institutional investors, such as endowment trustees for
256. Advantages & Disadvantages of Hedge Funds, MORTON CAPITAL MGMT., https://web.
archive.org/web/20141029110940/http://www.mortoncapital.com/advantages-of-hedge-funds
(last visited Sept. 8, 2015).
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Houman Shadab, Hedge Funds and the Financial Crisis 3 (Mercatus on Policy, Working
Paper No. 24, 2009), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1564847.
260. See generally Shadab, supra note 259.
261. Richard Teitelbaum, Soros Imitators Reap Riches in Financial Crisis on Macro Funds,
BLOOMBERG (Feb. 4, 2009, 7:01 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&
sid=ay.jqGduLoH8.
262. Shadab, supra note 259, at 2.
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universities, have been increasingly allocating a sizable portion of assets
to private funds.263
However, reports have recently surfaced that contrary to the
aforementioned data, hedge funds, similar to their mutual fund
counterparts, are not able to beat the markets and have historically
failed to exceed the S&P 500 Index.264 Such conflicting reports likely
result from the different methodologies used to measure hedge fund
returns, as private fund advisers are not required to employ standardized
valuation mechanisms.
Private fund indexes are also naturally
underinclusive, as these entities are not mandated to report performance
results to any existing index. Publicly available indexes primarily rely
on voluntary reporting from private funds. Analyzing average returns
across the industry is also problematic because private funds are
extraordinarily heterogeneous. Some funds mirror conservative
strategies comparable to mutual funds, while others pursue innovative
strategies that invest in exotic instruments and strategies.265 A more
useful comparison would account for the wide range of strategies
utilized by private funds, and would also consider the extent to which
performance results are negatively correlated to the markets that could
actually enhance the diversity of an existing portfolio.
Mutual funds are beginning to offer hedge fund-like strategies to
recruit investors who want to enjoy the benefits of alternative
investments, but they are still significantly limited in their investment
capabilities.266 Because of the constraints provided under the Company
Act, mutual fund advisers cannot engage in the same level of
263. Diversification Beyond Stocks, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/articles/05/
021105.asp (last visited Sept. 8, 2015).
264. Simon Lack, The Hedge Fund Mirage: The Illusion of Big Money and Why It’s Too Good
to Be True, CFA INST. CONF. PROC. Q., Dec. 2012, at 14–17, http://www.cfapubs.org/
doi/pdf/10.2469/cp.v29.n4.4 (arguing that on average, hedge funds have not been able to exceed
the risk-free rate of return provided by government issued treasury bills). But see generally
Thomas Schneeweis & Hossein B. Kazemi, An Academic Response to the ‘Hedge Fund Mirage,’
INST. FOR GLOBAL ASSET & RISK MGMT. (Sept. 30, 2012), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2228851
(providing a direct critique of the methodologies employed by the author of Hedge Fund Mirage:
“The author of ‘Hedge Fund Mirage’ does not have the net profits to hedge funds but such data is
required before true comparisons between net profit to investor and net profit to hedge fund
manager can be made . . . .”).
265. FILIPO STEFANINI, INVESTMENT STRATEGIES OF HEDGE FUNDS 2 (2006).
266. William Conroy, A Look At Hedge-Fund-Style Mutual Funds, FIN. ADVISOR (June 25,
2014), http://www.fa-mag.com/news/build-a-better-mousetrap—and-the-world-will-beat-a-pathto-your-door-18405.html; Rob Copeland, The New Hedge-Fund-Like Retail Funds, WALL ST. J
(Mar. 21, 2014, 5:24 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405270230328780457944513
4053667514; Sam Mamudi, Hedge Funds for the Masses, MKT. WATCH (Mar. 19, 2010, 7:29
PM), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/hedge-fund-like-mutual-funds-bid-for-your-money-201
0-03-19.
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derivatives trading and other innovative investments. In addition, they
do not have the same flexibility to react quickly to unforeseen market
swings. SEC officials have also started to investigate whether these
new products expose retail investors to increased harm.267 This could
perhaps deter public advisers from delving into these unique strategies
as the SEC may decide to implement more restrictive regulations.
C. Information
In addition to having privileged access to strategies, private fund
advisers often have privileged access to valuable information related to
such strategies. The tremendous value of information has been recently
illuminated by Michal Lewis’s bestselling commentary, Flash Boys,
where he shed light on the evolution of high-frequency trading
(“HFT”).268 HFT generally refers to the practice of relying on complex
algorithms to greatly accelerate the speed through which traders can
exploit informational gaps.269 Traders who gain access to the most
speed will essentially be the most profitable. Such timing advantages
are now measured in terms of milliseconds as technology continues to
rapidly evolve to produce higher speeds of transmitting data.270 For
those who do in fact develop the best technology in this regard, they
reap enormous profits because of the riskless nature of being first-inline. In fact, Tactical Trading Fund, a HFT hedge fund managed by
Chicago-based Citadel Investment Group, has increased in value by
over 300% since it opened its doors in 2007.271
Historically, the value of information has largely driven the structure
of our federal securities laws. Transparency is the cornerstone of this
intricate legal framework as issuers must publicly disclose all material
information related to an offering.272 This sweeping requirement
originates from the efficient market hypothesis, which broadly asserts
that any public information regarding a security will be immediately
impounded into its price.273 Mandating the disclosure of all material
267. Trevor Hunnicutt, Popular Liquid Alts Funds Face Regulatory Scrutiny: As Assets in
Retail Alternative Funds Balloons Regulators Probe Risks and Marketing, INVESTMENTNEWS
(June 24, 2014), http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20140624/FREE/140629964.
268. See generally MICHAEL LEWIS, FLASH BOYS: A WALL STREET REVOLT (2014).
269. High-Frequency Trading—HFT, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/h/
high-frequency-trading.asp (last visited Sept. 8, 2015).
270. Eamon Javers, High-Speed Trading: Profit—and Danger—in Milliseconds, CNBC (May
15, 2012, 3:31 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/47432428.
271. Citadel High-Frequency Trading Fund Up 300% Since Debut, FIN. ALTERNATIVES (Apr.
15, 2014, 12:25 PM), http://www.finalternatives.com/node/26756.
272. DE BEDTS, supra note 205, at 48.
273. See generally Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 168.
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information will thus ensure that the underlying prices of securities are
in effect accurate. As background, issuers of public companies must
provide a detailed registration statement upon issuing new offerings to
the general public.274
This document includes comprehensive
descriptions of the offering’s financial terms, management history, key
risk factors, audited financial statements, and a number of other relevant
items.275 Once this registration statement is filed and deemed effective,
companies must then submit public filings for any new material
developments that are not reflected in the initial registration
statement.276 Companies that are registered under the Exchange Act
must also file periodic reports on an annual and quarterly basis.277 A
variety of traders and other market participants quickly react to this
steady flow of information that is mandated under the federal securities
laws, as well as to information that is regularly released by unrelated
third parties. Through this immediate reactionary time, which has
grown faster over the years, the prices of publicly traded securities
rapidly incorporate publicly released information.
To guarantee that investors are not given an unfair advantage by
having privileged access to new information, insider trading is
prohibited under Rule 10b-5 of the Exchange Act.278 The specific
contours of the insider trading laws are beyond the scope of this Article,
but corporate insiders such as executives and employees are generally
restricted from trading on private information before disclosing it to the
general public.279 Relatedly, such insiders cannot provide material
nonpublic information to a family member or friend without potentially
running afoul of the insider trading laws.280 Regulation FD also
prohibits issuers from engaging in selective disclosure to certain
covered persons, which include individuals and entities likely to trade
on the information, such as broker-dealers, securities analysts,

274. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77g–77aa (2012).
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. See generally Langevoort & Thompson, supra note 147.
278. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j; 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2015).
279. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 227 (1980).
280. Dirks v. SEC., 463 U.S. 646, 660 (1983) (“[A] tippee assumes a fiduciary duty to the
shareholders of a corporation not to trade on material nonpublic information only when the
insider has breached his fiduciary duty to the shareholders by disclosing the information to the
tippee and the tippee knows or should know that there has been a breach.”); United States v.
Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 449 (2d Cir. 2014) (clarifying that in order for a tippee to face liability,
such tippee needs to have direct knowledge of the personal benefit that the tipper sought to
acquire in disclosing the material non-public information, which has arguably made it easier for
tippers to evade liability under the insider trading laws).
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investment advisors, and institutional investors.281 Prohibiting these
kinds of trading practices encourages participation in the public capital
markets by ensuring that the markets are fair and efficient. If investors
believe that they are allocating their limited capital to a rigged market
which serves the interests of a privileged few, then they are less likely
to purchase shares. This would in turn constrain the overall liquidity of
the public capital markets.
This Article does not broadly assert that private fund advisers are
knowingly and consistently violating the insider trading laws by
wrongfully profiting from nonpublic information. However, such
advisers often possess higher degrees of talent and technology to
process freshly released information, than their mutual fund
counterparts. This builds on the discussion provided in Part IV.B,
which describes the industry’s exclusive access to strategies.282 One
could argue that private fund advisers have more information regarding
the markets as a whole due to their exclusive access to a number of
instruments. Financial innovation has expanded the interconnectedness
of such markets, as the intricate relationship between derivatives,
securities, illiquid investments, fixed income products, and a number of
others, have correlative properties that are often exploited via arbitrage
by private funds. What happens on one corner of a particular
derivatives market will inevitably impact an innocuously related corner
of the securities markets. Furthermore, the insider trading laws that
apply to derivatives are not as well developed, or stringent, as the laws
that apply to securities.283 This is compounded by the risk that the
loosening restrictions for private funds could lead to an ongoing talent
drain in the mutual fund industry, which could further constrain the
potential returns for mutual fund investors.
Relatedly, this exclusive access to instruments can foster more
involved relationships with broker-dealers and other counterparties.
These relationships can yield privileged access to new developments
regarding various financial products and entities. As background,
private funds depend on prime brokers for a host of services such as
“centralized custody, clearing and settlement, financing, and

281. 17 C.F.R. § 243.100; id. § 243.103.
282. See infra Part IV.B.
283. See, e.g., Gary Rubin, CFTC Regulation 1.59 Fails to Adequately Regulate Insider
Trading, 53 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 599, 610–18 (2009) (highlighting limitations of applying insider
trading doctrine to commodities instruments since these markets are not generally governed by
corporate insiders such as CEOs, employees, and other categories of executives; further
identifying the limitations of CFTC 1.59 which attempts to prohibit insider trading by governing
members of commodities exchanges).
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recordkeeping.”284 Hedge fund advisers frequently trade higher
volumes of instruments than publicly registered funds, which produces
higher commissions for their prime broker counterparties. Private funds
can be a highly sought-after client for these large brokerage houses. In
a similar vein, counterparties may feel inclined to divulge valuable
information to private funds to garner positive ratings, which could then
boost their compensation and lead to increased future business.285
A number of empirical studies have found evidence of privileged
access to information.286 One such study compared publicly released
analyst reports to hedge fund holdings disclosed in Form 13F filings. 287
This statistical comparison showed that hedge funds were
opportunistically adjusting their positions prior to the release of a
publicly available analyst reports.288 For instance, if an analyst
published a downgrade for a particular company, a hedge fund would
decrease its holdings in such company immediately prior to the release
of such public statement. This study found no evidence that other
institutions, such as banks, insurance companies, and mutual funds, also
trade prior to analyst recommendations.289 Another study investigated
the extent to which hedge funds were front running the announcement
of merger and acquisition (“M&A”) deals.290 This study found that
certain hedge funds were increasing their holdings in a target’s stock
while decreasing holdings in an acquirer’s stock (or buying put options),
prior to the public announcement of the underlying M&A deal.291 This
284. LEMKE ET AL., supra note 75, § 1.
285. April Klein et al., Do Hedge Funds Trade on Private Information? Evidence from
Upcoming Changes in Analysts’ Stock Recommendations 6–7 (Apr. 7, 2014), http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2421801.
286. See, e.g., Nadia Massoud et al., Do Hedge Funds Trade on Private Information?
Evidence from Syndicated Lending and Short-Selling, 99 J. FIN. ECON. 477, 477–98 (2011)
(finding that a number of hedge fund participants in syndicated lending deals are short-selling
equity of borrowers before loan originations are publicly announced); David H. Solomon &
Eugene F. Soltes, What are We Meeting For? The Consequences of Private Meetings with
Investors, 58 J. L & ECON (forthcoming 2015-16) (finding that hedge fund advisers who meet
privately with management make more profitable trading decisions than other categories of
investors as a result of those meetings); Meng Gao & Jiekun Huang, Capitalizing on Capitol Hill:
Informed Trading by Hedge Fund Managers (June 2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers
.cfm?abstract_id=1707181## (finding evidence that hedge fund managers gain an informational
advantage in securities trading due to connections with lobbyists).
287. Klein et al., supra note 285, at 6.
288. Id. at 3.
289. Id. at 4.
290. See generally Rui Dai et al., Hedge Funds in M&A Deals: Is There Exploitation of
Private Information?, (Jan. 11, 2011), (available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abs
tract_id=1742641) (explaining how hedge funds abuse private insider information by disclosing
before the announcement of a merger or acquisition).
291. Id. at 6.
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strategy proved to be very profitable for this subset of funds.292
The implications of these studies are indeed debatable. Some results
can be attributed to heightened skill in processing information, and
others may imply that private fund advisers are systematically engaged
in illegal insider trading activities. Attributing the appropriate causes to
these clearly identifiable results is an admittedly difficult task. Even
still, acknowledging that private funds have exclusive access to
information regarding a broad spectrum of financial instruments is
important for assessing the adverse impacts of the current regulatory
climate. As this industry continues to grow, the general public will face
growing inequities in terms of access to strategies, as well as access to
information that is integral to understanding the increasing
interconnectedness of the markets.
IV. BROADER IMPLICATIONS
This Part sheds light on the broader implications of the growing
inequities discussed herein. For the most part, retail investors are facing
unique financial challenges, some of which include dwindling
retirement accounts and declining property values. These challenges are
likely adding to the unfortunate disappearance of the middle class.
Creating a framework that allows elite investors to have
disproportionate access to a variety of strategies and information could
potentially aggravate these issues and further deepen the already
embarrassing income gap between the wealthy and the average investor.
A. Unique Financial Challenges Facing Retail Investors
Easing the regulatory burdens for private funds seems to embody one
of the primary goals of the current regulatory climate. Academics have
even called into question the underlying meaning of the term “public”
as the JOBS Act, and other regulatory reforms, have gradually chipped
away at the boundary between public and private vehicles.293 Despite
the fact that these increased freedoms could facilitate capital formation
in the broader economy, they will inevitably lead to even greater
inequities between elite and average investors. Professor Gubler
identifies this phenomenon as the “crowding out” of the retail
investor.294 He specifically states that “[a]s the private securities
market expands, the retail investor is crowded out, and the model of

292. Id.
293. See generally Langevoort & Thompson, supra note 147; Hillary A. Sale, The New
‘Public’ Corporation, 74 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 137 (2011).
294. Gubler, supra note 24, at 799–801.
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democratic capitalism that has defined the American corporate
landscape for nearly a century is upended.”295 The fact that retail
investors are often excluded from a massive and growing market that
could greatly improve portfolio diversification, as well as access to
information related to mutual fund investments, seems to undercut
notions of freedom and equity implicit in a free market economy.
The regulatory justification for this divide is rooted in investor
protection principles, as the law recognizes that the general public may
not have the financial acumen or the resources to appropriately protect
themselves against riskier investments. Yet, as the private industry
continues to grow and extend its reach to the general public, albeit
indirectly through systemic risk and retailization, these investor
protection rationales become less convincing.296 Given the exponential
growth of the private fund industry, if a systemic risk event should
occur with respect to a private fund, or a group of private funds, the
entire economy would be at risk.297 This Article does not suggest that
investor protection should be completely disregarded for the sake of
expanding investment opportunities for the general public. Rather, it
asserts that inequitable opportunities should be systematically
researched by a variety of disciplines, particularly since the economic
conditions facing retail investors are dire.
As retail investors face dwindling retirement and savings accounts, an
increasing retirement age, and decreasing property values, the
disparities created by this divide become more problematic and more
difficult to justify.
Several politicians and commentators have
highlighted the growing woes for middle class Americans, even when
such families come from two-income households.298 The Great
Recession annihilated the retirement income for the general public as
millions of 401(k) accounts, which largely depend on mutual fund
295. Id.
296. See generally Martin, Private Investment Companies, supra note 37 (discussing the
extent to which investor protection principles have been undermined by the sophisticated investor
exemption).
297. Andrew Lo, Professor, Mass. Inst. Tech., Written Testimony for the U.S. House of
Representatives Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 8–11 (Nov. 13, 2008)
(transcript available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1301217).
298. See generally ELIZABETH WARREN & AMEILIA WARREN TYAGI, THE TWO-INCOME
TRAP: WHY MIDDLE-CLASS PARENTS ARE GOING BROKE (2003); Jan Diehm & Katy Hall,
Middle Class Jobs, Income Quickly Disappearing, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 11, 2013),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/06/middle-class-jobs-income-_n_3386157.html; Roger
Runningen, Obama Highlights Middle-Class Struggles, Stalled Congress, BLOOMBERG NEWS
(July 30, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-07-30/obama-highlights-middle-classstruggles-stalled-congress.html (asserting that President Obama has routinely advocated to
increase support for the disappearing middle class).
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investments, rapidly declined in value. Some estimates have found that
the Great Recession “reduced the median balance in 401(k)s by a third
between 2007 and 2008.”299 According to a recent Gallop poll, 59% of
Americans have identified retirement as their highest financial
concern.300 Moreover, close to 25% of the workforce has postponed
their retirement and 61% are saving little to nothing.301 They are
essentially living paycheck to paycheck.302 It is also questionable
whether the government-funded social security program is sustainable
in the long run, which is compounded by the fact that by 2040, there
will be approximately 40 million additional senior citizens living in the
United States.303
B. Growing Income Gap
While most of the American population is facing heightened financial
struggles, the top earners are doing quite well. Popular discourse has
recently shed light on the embarrassing yet increasing income gap
between the wealthy and the average earner in this country. According
to one study instituted by Emmanuel Saez of the University of
California, Berkeley, the “top 1 percent [of earners] captured 93% of the
income gains during the first year of recovery from the [Great
Recession].”304 On average, “more than half [of nation’s income gains
accrue] to the richest 1 percent [of the nation while] . . . over 6 percent
of national income accru[es] to the top .01 percent of families.”305
These top earners predominantly include company executives/managers
and financial company executives/managers.306 Hedge fund managers
are often the top earners in this group. 307 Professor Thomas Piketty
299. JACOB S. HACKER & PAUL PIERSON, WINNER-TAKE-ALL POLITICS: HOW WASHINGTON
MADE THE RICH RICHER AND TURNED ITS BACK ON THE MIDDLE CLASS 30 (2010).
300. Kate Rogers, Fewer Americans Plan to Rely on 401(k) Plans in Retirement, FOX BUS.
(May 6, 2014), http://www.foxbusiness.com/personal-finance/2014/05/06/fewer-americans-planto-rely-on-401k-plans-in-retirement.
301. Laura Bassett, Dwindling Retirement Savings ‘Undiscussed Explosive Bomb’ Of
Recession, HUFFINGTON POST (July 30, 2010), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/07/30/
dwindling-retirement-savi_n_665484.html.
302. Id.
303. Peter G. Peterson, WILL AMERICA GROW UP BEFORE IT GROWS OLD? HOW THE
COMING SOCIAL SECURITY CRISIS THREATENS YOU, YOUR FAMILY, AND YOUR COUNTRY 23
(1996).
304. Emmanuel Saez, Striking it Richer: The Evolution of Top Incomes in the United States,
http://eml.berkeley.edu/~saez/saez-UStopincomes-2013.pdf (last updated Jan. 25, 2015).
305. HACKER & PIERSON, supra note 299, at 17.
306. Id.
307. See generally Nathan Vardi, The 25 Highest-Earning Hedge Fund Managers And
Traders, FORBES (Feb. 26, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/nathanvardi/2014/02/26/the-high
est-earning-hedge-fund-managers-and-traders/ (discussing the large sums of money earned by
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likewise provides an in-depth economic analysis of both the scale and
the drivers of this growing income gap.308 He examined historical data
from over twenty countries, spanning across the past two centuries, to
find that the main contributor to these disparities is the troubling trend
of returns on capital exceeding total economic growth.309 He
specifically states:
The inequality r [return on capital] >g [growth] implies that wealth
accumulated in the past grows more rapidly than output and wage.
This inequality expresses a fundamental logical contradiction. The
entrepreneur inevitably tends to become a rentier, more and more
dominant over those who have nothing but their labor. Once
constituted, capital reproduces itself faster and faster than output
increases. The past devours the future.310

The implications of these disparities are a widely contested topic. On
one end of the spectrum, economists have found that they are a natural
result of economic growth, and that aggressively advocating for equality
can actually reduce overall efficiency, weaken incentives to work, and
mitigate future innovations.311 Economists on the opposite end of this
debate have found that such disparities can lead to slower economic
growth, less stable expansions, and political unrest.312 A 2011 study
instituted by Andrew G. Berg and Jonathan D. Ostry of the International
Monetary Fund came to similar conclusions.313 They found that “[t]he
difference between countries that can sustain rapid growth for many
years or even decades and the many others that see growth spurts fade
quickly may be the level of inequality. Countries may find that
improving equality may also improve efficiency, understood as more
sustainable long-run growth.”314 From a social and psychological
perspective, others have found that severe income disparities can lead to
“cycles of entitlement for the affluent and an acceptance of less
equitable outcomes by the poor”315 and that “[w]ealthy individuals are
more likely to break traffic laws and cheat at games.”316 Despite where
certain hedge fund managers in 2013).
308. See PIKETTY, supra note 33, at 15 (explaining the methodology used in the author’s
research).
309. Id.
310. Id. at 571.
311. See generally ARTHUR OKUN, EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY: THE BIG TRADEOFF (1975).
312. Annie Lowrey, Costs Seen in Income Inequality, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2012, at B1.
313. Andrew G. Berg & Jonathan D. Ostry, Equality and Efficiency, 48 FIN. & DEV., Sept.
2011.
314. Id.
315. Sethi, supra note 38, at 798.
316. Scientists Study the Negative Effects of Income Inequality, PBS (June 25, 2013),
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/extra/daily_videos/scientists-study-the-negative-effects-of-income-
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one falls on this spectrum, growing inequities tend to be unsustainable
and they can actually harm capital formation in the long run.317
The causes of the financial dilemmas facing retail investors, as well
as the causes of the growing income gap, are admittedly complex.
Inequitable tax rates,318 excessive executive pay,319 and technological
innovation,320 are a few of the contributing factors that have been
researched by commentators across disciplines. It is also difficult to
immediately draw a direct correlation between the structure of our
federal securities laws, and the increasing divide between the wealthy
and the average earner. However, this Article should at least
demonstrate that more research is needed in this regard. At face value,
it seems unsettling to encourage a regulatory system where top earners
have access to even greater capital gains through private investments,
while the general public is left with investments that are subpar. Mutual
fund strategies account for an extremely narrow portion of the universe
of available strategies within the broader financial sector. This
inequitable access will continue to grow, as the current regulatory
climate will lead to an even greater expansion of the private fund
industry. The extent to which these private investments simply agitate
the problematic conclusion derived by Professor Piketty, in that returns
on capital exceed economic growth, likewise needs to be further
researched. Certain private vehicles could be utilizing strategies that do
not promote overall economic growth by encouraging naked speculation
and other problematic innovations. This is yet another hotly contested
topic that warrants additional investigation.

inequality/.
317. See generally STEVEN A. RAMIREZ, LAWLESS CAPITALISM: THE SUBPRIME CRISIS AND
THE CASE FOR AN ECONOMIC RULE OF LAW (N.Y. Univ. Press, 2014) (arguing that the
concentration of political and economic power among the “super” elite, particularly in the context
of the recent subprime mortgage crisis, can actually nullify the positive aspects of capitalism in
the long run).
318. THOMAS L. HUNGERFORD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42729, TAXES AND THE
ECONOMY: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE TOP TAX RATES SINCE 1945, at 16 (2012),
(“[C]hanges over the past 65 years in the top marginal tax rate and the top capital gains tax rate
do not appear correlated with economic growth. The reduction in the top tax rates appears to be
uncorrelated with saving, investment, and productivity growth. The top tax rates appear to have
little or no relation to the size of the economic pie.”).
319. Roberto A. Ferdman, The Pay Gap Between CEOs and Workers Is Much Worse than You
Realize, WASH. POST (Sept. 25, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonkblog/wp/
2014/09/25/the-pay-gap-between-ceos-and-workers-is-much-worse-than-you-realize/.
320. Philippe Aghion et al., Innovation and Top Income Inequality 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper 21247, 2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id
=2617607 (“[T]he rise in top income shares is partly related to innovation-led growth, where
innovation itself fosters social mobility at the top through creative destruction.”).
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CONCLUSION: STUCK BETWEEN A ROCK AND A HARD PLACE
Crafting a viable solution highlights the unique challenges of
applying a reliable cost-benefit analysis to new regulations in light of
the growing complexities of the financial markets. For example,
loosening the antiquated trading restrictions that apply to mutual fund
investments would allow advisers to employ strategies that could further
protect investors in declining markets. This would create better
opportunities for wealth maximization and diversification for the
general public. And because mutual funds are subject to the detailed
registration requirements under the Company Act (and other
enhancements under the Dodd-Frank Act), retail investors would still be
given appropriate investor protections through mandated disclosures
and other heightened governance requirements. These provisions could
also serve to mitigate systemic risk as the resulting transparency can
“weed out” speculative activities that are in fact harmful to the
economy.
However, the costs to market integrity and investor protection could
be monumental. Contrary to the previous assertion, loosening these
restrictions could also increase the collective levels of speculative
trading activity, which in itself is difficult to appropriately quantify.
John Bogle, a notable expert in the mutual fund industry, has insistently
noted the risks of increasing speculation in the broader economy. 321
Exclusively profiting from the short-term prices movements in
instruments, as opposed to making long-term investments in companies,
could arguably compromise economic growth. Moreover, increased
flexibilities granted to mutual fund advisers could result in heightened
litigation costs with respect to insider trading violations if advisers do in
fact gain increased access to information.
Alternatively, specific limitations could be imposed on private funds’
leverage exposure and related derivatives trading activities. This would
level the playing field for retail investors and simultaneously reduce
systemic risk as excessive leverage could expose the general public to
substantial harms. Nevertheless, the costs of limiting such activities
could unduly constrain capital formation. This is further complicated
by the fact that pension funds and other institutional investors (that are
comprised of underlying retail investors) are increasingly investing in
these vehicles. Choosing appropriate caps would also seem like an
arbitrary endeavor as it is not clear that our regulators have sufficient
expertise to properly assess the long-term impacts of such a
321. See generally JOHN C. BOGLE, THE CLASH OF THE CULTURES: INVESTMENT VS.
SPECULATION (2012) (arguing that excessive speculation can divert capital from its optimal use).
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monumental change. Enforcing such caps could be problematic as well,
because the SEC and the CFTC are already faced with limited
resources.
There is a plethora of both doctrinal and empirical research that
supports both of these positions, each of which are rooted in a rich
history of legal and economic theories. But much of this research is
limited by a pervasive lack of coordination regarding the broad
spectrum of areas that are implicated by these complex and evolving
issues. This is particularly troubling because this area produces a large
volume of new regulations on an annual basis, and the SEC, as well as
Congress, is required to incorporate a cost-benefit analysis before
adopting each rule. In the event of a financial crisis, Congress hurriedly
produces corrective legislation to quiet public uproar. As a result, it is
often unclear whether the legislation is closely tailored to the problems
at hand. Furthermore, lawyers are often limited in their overall
knowledge of the financial markets, even though they are the primary
drafters and enforcers of new and existing rules. For instance, Bernie
Madoff evaded the SEC for years despite the SEC being tipped off by a
whistleblower and being subsequently registered under the Advisers
Act.322
In order to effectively incorporate a reliable cost-benefit analysis in
the context of minimizing the inequities discussed herein, a greater
effort must be undertaken by our regulators to aggressively study these
issues from the perspective of a wide range of experts (e.g., legal,
economic, financial, banking, quantitative analysis, etc.). The SEC
made recent improvements in this area when it created the Division of
Economic and Risk Analysis (“DERA”) in September 2009.323 This
division was designed to “integrate financial economics and rigorous
data analytics into the core mission of the SEC”324 and it “relies on a
variety of academic disciplines, quantitative and non-quantitative
approaches, and knowledge of market institutions and practices to help
the Commission approach complex matters in a fresh light.”325 The
DERA is also comprised of the Office of Asset Management which
“[p]rovides economic and other interdisciplinary analysis in support of
the Commission on issues related to the regulation of investment
advisers, investment companies, hedge funds, and other institutional
322. Robert Chew, A Madoff Whistle-Blower Tells His Story, TIME (Feb. 4, 2009),
http://content.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1877181,00.html.
323. About Division of Economic and Risk Analysis, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N,
http://www.sec.gov/dera/Article/about.html (last visited Sept. 8, 2015).
324. Id.
325. Id.
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investors.”326 Creating this division has undoubtedly assisted the SEC
in exploring these emerging developments from a variety of
perspectives. Heightened coordination is needed particularly with
respect to private actors in the private fund industry to deepen the
SEC’s familiarity with innovative products and strategies. This
heightened coordination could perhaps happen through an intensive
study conducted through the DERA. From an even broader perspective,
a greater commitment by law schools to further develop the curricula
related to financial regulation should also be undertaken. This would
further ensure that new lawyers are exposed to these pertinent issues at
earlier points in their careers.
In addition, the SEC has only partial jurisdiction over the instruments
traded by investment funds. The SEC has direct jurisdiction to
supervise the securities industry,327 and the CFTC is authorized to
supervise the bulk of the derivatives industry. 328 Investment companies
that trade in both securities and derivatives must therefore comply with
the arduous registration requirements of these two separate regimes.
This creates several inefficiencies in producing optimal regulation and
has even been identified as a culprit in failing to foresee numerous
financial crises.329 As these two industries have become increasingly
interwoven,330 both agencies must combine their resources to develop
an optimal solution for the growing inequities facing retail investors.
This could perhaps be accomplished through the creation of a joint
advisory commission of the SEC and the CFTC, comprised of experts
from both the public and private sectors. This commission would be
committed to the ongoing task of collecting and studying information
related to the financial markets, in an effort to enhance the factors that
are used to implement an effective cost-benefit analysis.
Overall, the importance of these issues should be duly noted and
further researched by a variety of disciplines. Financial innovation has
been expertly mined by a growing private industry while antiquated
regulations have excluded retail investors from many of the resulting
benefits. These inequities will only serve to further aggravate the

326. Id.
327. The Investor’s Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market Integrity,
and Facilitates Capital Formation, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/about/
whatwedo.shtml (last visited Sept. 8, 2015).
328. Mission and Responsibilities, U.S. COMMODITIES FUTURES COMM’N, http://www.cftc.
gov/About/MissionResponsibilities/index.htm (last visited Sept. 8, 2015).
329. Jerry Markham, Merging the CFTC and SEC—Clash of Cultures, 78 U. CIN. L. REV.
537, 572 (2009).
330. Id. at 587.
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already dire financial challenges facing the average investor. The need
for effective regulations that minimize the costs incurred to both
individual investors and society at large is pressing. The markets have
grown exceedingly complex and developing sound regulations, as
opposed to regulations that simply serve the highest bidder or that are
passed in haste to quiet public uproar, will inevitably entail enhanced
coordination between the SEC and the CFTC, and improved
collaboration with related industries (e.g., economic, financial, banking,
quantitative analysis, etc.). These suggestions, of course, necessitate
further analysis and will likely form the basis for my future research.

